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ABSTRACT 
 
Kevin Anthony Miceli: From Garage Inventor to Garage Entrepreneur 
(Under the direction of Atul Nerkar) 
 
The American garage serves as the backdrop for the image of the independent 
entrepreneur.  However, literature highlights the importance of resources for entrepreneurs 
that are derived from experience in firms, universities, or markets.  This dissertation 
investigates how theories from those entrepreneurship studies can be applied in the context of 
independent (“garage”) invention that results in garage entrepreneurship.  In studying the 
process used by garage entrepreneurs, it elucidates how the technological, social, and 
geographical opportunity spaces present in the pre-venture period could affect the decision to 
form a new venture.   
Using data of non-affiliated technologies from the USPTO during 1975–2009, I 
analyze inventors and technologies that are at risk of forming a firm in order to understand 
which characteristics increase the likelihood of entrepreneurship given prior technological 
development. In the data, I identify a risk-set of 152,092 inventors who will start 5,684 new 
firms. I find that the nature of the opportunity spaces through competition and resources is 
associated with the transition from inventor to entrepreneur and increased experience and 
network strength can substitute for organizational affiliation.  Finally, while all inventors in 
this study start independently in the metaphorical garage, those who transition to an existing 
company are more likely to spin back out after experience in smaller firms and twice as 
likely to start a new firm as those who do not join an existing organization. 
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PREFACE 
What if everyone could have one of these amazing machines in their own house? There's just 
one problem: They're as big as a house. The solution comes in, of all places, a garage in 
California. Young people with a passion for shaping the future put the power of the computer 
in everyone's hands. Together, we form a super network that glows with billions of 
interactions, and once again we stand on the brink of a new Renaissance. 
 
… For the first time in history, all of us can have a say about the kind of world we want to 
live in. The choices we have made for the past 30,000 years have been inventing the future 
one day at a time. And now, it's your turn. 
 
Spaceship Earth, EPCOT 
 
 
A Garage and an Idea: What More Does an Entrepreneur Need? 
Audia and Rider (2005) 
Okay, well… probably a lot. 
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
 
Where do new organizations come from and who is at risk of founding those 
organizations?  These are two of the fundamental questions in organizational and 
entrepreneurship research (Aldrich and Ruef, 2006; Gartner, 1985; Krueger, 2002; Shane and 
Venkataraman, 2000).  An enduring image in American culture is the heroic “garage 
inventor” turned entrepreneur (Audia and Rider, 2005; Cohen, 2011; Engber, 2013).  This 
study, starting with the metaphorical garage, clearly identifies a set of individuals at risk of 
starting a firm in order to isolate and address the first question in the technological space, a 
phenomenon addressed as the “garage entrepreneur” for this study.   
The garage has served as the setting for new entrepreneurs like such as Roy and Walt 
Disney leading to the Walt Disney Company, Ruth Handler who created the Barbie Doll and 
founded Mattel,  Steve Jobs and Steve Wozniak of Apple, and Bill Hewlett and David 
Packard for Hewlett-Packard (Cohen, 2011).  Hewlett and Packard’s story was so important 
that the garage they worked in is a designated historic landmark as the birthplace of Silicon 
Valley (Engber, 2013).   
This dissertation studies the transition from independent invention to the start of new 
technological firms. In doing so, it investigates one of the first selection mechanisms along 
the evolutionary path from technological discovery to commercialization and market 
acceptance. Investigating the role of independent inventors in new firm formation, the 
research question is: what factors at the potential founding time affect the likelihood of a 
garage inventor becoming a garage entrepreneur? 
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In addressing the phenomenon, I will be investigating problems at the intersection of 
strategy, technology, and entrepreneurship.  With respect to innovation, Teece (1986) 
highlights the difference between value creation and value capturing in technological 
innovation. Having overcome the challenge of creating a new technology, these inventors 
still face great obstacles in identifying means of protecting and profiting from their ideas 
(Gans, Hsu, and Stern, 2002).  Prior research in technological venture formation frequently 
focus on knowledge sources for entrepreneurship that include firm spin-offs and employee 
entrepreneurship (Chatterji, 2009; Klepper, 2007; Klepper and Sleeper, 2005), university 
transfer (Katila and Shane, 2005; Shane, 2001a; Stuart and Ding, 2006), and user 
entrepreneurship (Shah and Tripsas, 2007; Tripsas, 2008).  In each setting, the entrepreneur 
is able to overcome the complementary asset problem using different resources from his or 
her experience. 
I am interested specifically in the perspective of the non-affiliated inventor(s) and the 
technology and context around them.  Rather than from the perspective of the incumbent 
fearing disruption (Christensen, 1997), I explore the garage inventors and how the 
technological, social, and geographical environmental characteristics affect entrepreneurship.  
In doing so, I connect with recent research efforts that encourage investigation into the 
entrepreneurship processes not affiliated with firms or universities (Åstebro, 1998; e.g. 
independent inventors ‒ Åstebro and Dahlin, 2005; ‘Edisons or Hobbyists’ ‒ Dahlin, Taylor, 
and Fichman, 2004; ‘user entrepreneurs’ ‒ Shah and Tripsas, 2007).   
Utilizing a process model of entrepreneurship (Shane and Venkataraman, 2000), this 
study takes place after potentially recognizing an opportunity but before success or failure of 
commercialization.  This space evaluates the inventor’s decision to form a venture but not 
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necessarily whether it is yet successful.  In doing so, I am able to highlight a step in an 
evolutionary process for which inventors select themselves (or are selected) into 
entrepreneurship.  This selection mechanism allows an insight into the options that are 
presented for later market selection. 
In order to answer the question, I consider theories developed in other settings that 
resulted in entrepreneurial startups such as through university and firm spin-offs.  While I 
draw from the logic that proved valuable in those settings, it is not immediately known if all 
the theories will hold in the same manner, and complement the theories with inventor 
independence.  Independent inventors do not have access to the same resources or networks 
and may not develop technologies in line with those sources.  I specifically develop 
hypotheses surrounding the nature of the technological, social, and geographical opportunity 
spaces in which the nascent entrepreneurs are operating. 
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CHAPTER 2: RESEARCH PHENOMENON 
 
“Face it: Out there in some garage, an entrepreneur is forging a bullet with your company’s 
name on it.” – Gary Hamel (1999: 72) 
The role of independent inventors and/or small firms have been debated in the 
literature (e.g. Amesse et al., 1991; Cohen, 2010; Fontana et al., 2012) for some time.   
Classic Debates 
Joseph Schumpeter is frequently seen as arguing on both sides and starting the debate 
of the importance of entrepreneurs and technological development, which is the engine of 
economic growth in his models.  Schumpeter’s gales of creative destruction are either 
primarily the realm of innovative entrepreneurs developing new technologies through radical 
new combinations of existing ideas and destabilizing the incumbents (Schumpeter, 1934) or 
are the product of the large R&D laboratories (Schumpeter, 1942) where large firms play a 
very important role.  In economics, this argument has frequently been evaluated as 
determining the firm size (Cohen and Klepper, 1996b; Prusa and Schmitz Jr., 1991) or 
market structure that promotes innovation – i.e. do large monopolists have the incentive to 
innovate to avoid future competition (Cohen and Levin, 1989; Scherer and Ross, 1990)? 
In the mid-twentieth century, scholars pick up the debate between inventors and large 
R&D labs again.  In 1957, Jacob Schmookler addressed the prevailing idea that the inventor 
no longer has a place in innovation.  He concluded that the large-scale enterprises are 
unquestionably contributing to technological progress but claiming that large R&D firms 
alone drive advancement is “entirely unwarranted” (Schmookler, 1957: 330).  In his sample, 
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14% percent of the inventors assigned their patent to themselves or unassigned rather than a 
firm or the government.  Additionally, he found that 7% of the inventions by technologists 
were “Not Part of [the] Job” (Schmookler, 1957: 332).  
Jewkes, Sawer, and Stillerman (1971) similarly studied great inventions of the early 
twentieth century.  In a study of sixty major inventions, half of them were invented by 
individual inventors without the support of research institutions.  They evaluate that studies 
“continue to provide evidence of the important role of the independent inventor” (Jewkes et 
al., 1971: 205).  They do however include university researchers in the independent category 
as long as the invention could clearly be linked to the efforts of the specific inventor and as 
long as the inventors were working autonomously, even within the university context.  In 
more recent years, university spin-offs, that could have been some of those represented as 
independent in their sample, have received attention in academic literature (Foray and 
Lissoni, 2010; Jaffe, Fogarty, and Banks, 1998; Katila and Shane, 2005; Nerkar and Shane, 
2003; Shane, 2001a). At the time of the Jewkes, Sawer, and Stillerman study, the rate of 
patenting amongst independent inventors had been declining.  They acknowledge that the 
type of invention going forward may yet make laboratories and firms the source of invention, 
but conclude that it is still important to keep researching all avenues of such invention. 
Recent Literature 
More recently, Audia and Rider (2005) performed a study specifically on the image 
of the “garage entrepreneur.”  They conducted a random phone survey to test the popularity 
of the myth, finding that 87% of respondents could name at least one company started in a 
garage, basement, dorm room, or kitchen – where Apple and HP were the most likely 
responses.  In a survey of 32 startups with VC funding in 2004, they found that 25% of the 
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firms did start in garages, basements, dorm rooms, or kitchens.  However, these were 
temporary locations early on and the authors highlighted that 91% of the companies were 
related to the founders’ prior industry experience and prior social ties were important in 66% 
of the companies.  They state that entrepreneurs are organizational products and feel that the 
image can be detrimental to individuals trying to become entrepreneurs by not emphasizing 
the social and knowledge source aspects and policy makers, business schools, and popular 
press should not highlight the phrase.  Audia and Rider conclude that research on individual 
entrepreneurship should focus on identifying access to organizations, which can provide 
information on opportunities, role experience, social contacts, and access to key resources.   
Other recent scholars have been calling for more studies in relation to independent 
inventors and innovation (e.g. Åstebro, 1998; Dahlin et al., 2004; Shah and Tripsas, 2007).  
Åstebro performed a survey of Canadian inventors who sought help from the Inventor’s 
Assistance Program (IAP).  With 1,095 responses, he was therefore able to study a sample of 
inventors with information at the time of IAP application as well as measures of performance 
from his independent survey.  He reported the results in a series of articles. 
Åstebro found that 6.5% of inventions by independent inventors reach the market, 
four-to-eight times less than inventions by established firms (Åstebro, 1998).  However, he 
found that, conditional on commercialization, costs of development were about 1/8 those of 
other firms and they were able to obtain gross margins comparable to established firms.  
Specifically, of the 75 firms in his sample that reached commercialization, the average IRR 
was 11.4%.  The returns were highly skewed though as six realized returns above 1400% and 
60% obtained negative returns (Åstebro, 2003).  He also noted that while 75% of the 
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inventors were told by the IAP not to pursue their idea commercially, 50% of those continued 
working on it (Åstebro and Gerchak, 2001). 
Evaluating the characteristics of success in his sample, Åstebro reported that of 36 
characteristics of innovation, technology, and the market, four stand out as being related to 
eventual success: expected profitability, technological opportunity, development risk, and 
appropriability conditions (Åstebro, 2004).  Clarifying further, technological opportunity is 
related to commercialization if the inventor believed his or her invention had high technical 
performance and low technical uncertainty (Åstebro and Dahlin, 2005).  They suggest that 
the independent inventors applied for patents without taking into account commercialization 
considerations based on their survey results.  Lastly, Åstebro and Dahlin find that the 
dominant mode (82%) of sales is through self-commercialization with the inventor involved.  
Regarding profitability expectations, the significant characteristics were price required for 
profitability and anticipated stable demand (Åstebro and Michela, 2005). 
In a different study, Dahlin, Taylor, and Fichman (2004) took up the debate whether 
independent inventors were “future Edisons or weekend hobbyists.”  They sought to answer 
whether there was significant technical content and merit to encourage policy support of 
independent inventors.  In the specific setting of tennis racket patents, they found that 65% of 
patents were held by independent inventors as compared to corporates and 59% of the 
independent inventors held multiple patents in the area.  Analyzing the nature of independent 
inventions as compared to those developed by firms, the authors found that there is 
significant variation in the quality of inventions by independent inventors.  They found that 
independent inventors are over-represented in both the most important and the least 
important pool of inventions in this category. 
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Singh and Fleming (2010) address the debate on the importance of variance in 
independent inventor outcomes as well, coming to different conclusions.  Following 
literature that suggests variance is the important measure for creative outcomes (Fleming, 
2001, 2007; Girotra, Terwiesch, and Ulrich, 2010), Singh and Fleming seek to test whether 
variance and mean performance are positively related in a large sample of patented 
inventions.  Rather than suggesting that merely having variance is a good thing, they suggest 
that independent inventors will be more highly represented in the lower tail and less highly 
represented in the upper tail as compared to corporate inventors.  They argue that corporate 
and team-based inventions will be better selected so as to eliminate poor outcomes prior to 
patenting.  Additionally, corporate and team invention carry benefits such as access to a 
greater variety of knowledge to recombine – thus increasing the likelihood of creating 
breakthrough ideas.  They supported this argument using quantile regression on over half a 
million patents that independent inventors are more likely to produce very poor outcomes 
and simultaneously less likely to create breakthroughs as compared to their corporate 
partners.  They do not address entrepreneurship or commercialization but aim to enhance the 
debate on the (non-)importance of independent inventors based on their comparative 
inventive output. 
In another study, Sirilli (1987) completed a study on over 500 inventors who filed 
patents under the Italian patent system in 1981.  He found that 60% of the respondents were 
associated with a firm and the other 40% were “individual” inventors, although the 
population of patents from which his sample was drawn showed 51% of the patents had firm 
association in 1981 according to the Patent Office.  Sirilli’s main emphasis was on describing 
the background of the inventors in the sample and the incentives for invention.  He found that 
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nearly three-quarters of the inventors claimed their invention would have been developed 
even in the absence of the patenting institution.  However, he still found patenting important 
and necessary for protecting their inventions. 
Weick and Eakin (2005) repeat the call for more studies of independent inventors. In 
a short survey, they sought to investigate who these inventors are, measure the level and 
direction of their inventive activity, analyze how frequently these inventors take their 
products to market and in what manner, and test the correlations between sales achieved and 
market choices such as outright invention sale, start-ups, or licensing.  Surveying individuals 
on the mailing list of the United Inventors Association (UIA) and the Inventors’ Digest, they 
received 351 responses to a questionnaire on biographical and invention details, which 
represented a 9% response rate as measured over the total size of the mailing list.  Most of 
their responses tended to work on hardware/tool, household products, industrial/commercial 
products, novelty items, and toys/games/hobbies.  They found that 39% of their population 
generated some sales and 20% made a profit.  In this sample, higher likelihood of achieving 
any sales was associated with starting their own business but a higher level of sales was 
associated with licensing rather than outright invention sale or starting their own business. 
Lastly, a rising area of interest in the literature is highlighting user entrepreneurship 
(Chatterji and Fabrizio, 2014; von Hippel, 1988; Shah, Smith, and Reedy, 2012; Shah and 
Tripsas, 2007).  From Shah and Tripsas (2007), the definition of user entrepreneurship is “the 
commercialization of a new product and/or service by an individual or group of individuals 
who are also users of that product and/or service” (Shah and Tripsas, 2007: 124). They 
further segment this into two categories: professional-users and end-users.  In this definition, 
it is not strictly restricted to individuals outside of work or research relationships. The area 
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significantly overlaps, especially with end-users or consumer goods and sports products, 
which has been tested under the user entrepreneurship model (Fauchart and Gruber, 2011; 
Shah, 2005).  However it also includes physicians using medical devices and providing their 
feedback to the manufacturers (Chatterji and Fabrizio, 2012).  Shah and Tripsas (2007: 123–
124) specifically call for increasing the study of entrepreneurship out of the regular contexts 
of firm and university spin-offs which leads them to the area of demand-use and user 
entrepreneurship.  I repeat the call for study outside of university, firms, or other 
organizations but suggest that the alternative category is broadly independent invention.  I 
then do not yet assume characteristics of the motivations of the inventors and entrepreneurs 
but define the scope of this study based on their working relationship, primarily through a 
clear patenting relationship with an existing organization prior to the inventor become 
independent.   
To wrap up the question of significance, a recent study on the acquisition and 
commercialization of invention suggests that 49% of manufacturing firms that innovated 
during 2007 – 2009 did so with a product that originated outside the focal institution, namely 
through customers, suppliers, and “technology specialists” that included independent 
inventors (Arora, Cohen, and Walsh, 2014).  They found that while customers were the most 
frequent source of such inventions, technology specialists provided inventions that were 
more economically valuable. 
Garage Inventor to Garage Entrepreneur 
For this study, I use two terms that define the context and constructs – a garage 
inventor and a garage entrepreneur.  A “garage inventor” is an individual or individuals 
whose technological product or process, embodied in their first patent, is developed 
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outside the context of a firm, university, government, or other formal organization.  
Specifically, the inventors own the technologies themselves rather than assigning it to 
another organizational entity.  It is important to note that this definition does not include all 
independent inventors where a technology is not assigned to an organization.  The “garage” 
status of an inventor is defined at the time of his or her first patent.  Inventors who first 
develop technologies for an existing firm may later have independent (i.e. non-assigned) 
patents but they will not be considered “garage” under this definition.  Additionally, this 
status is limited to independence of an organizational affiliation but not limited by “lone 
wolf” inventive status where the inventor does not work with anyone in the invention stages.  
In fact, the co-inventing relationships will prove to be important substitutes for working 
relationships.  A “garage entrepreneur” is the garage inventor who subsequently starts a 
new technological firm after such invention.  A garage entrepreneur will therefore be a 
subset of garage inventors for this context.  This differentiates from inventor/entrepreneurs 
associated with other new technological entities in the patent database.  To test knowledge 
use and development for garage entrepreneurship, I focus solely on the venture formation 
conditional on having developed a new technology.  This results in the study highlighting 
this type of technological entrepreneurship where technologies were not spun out from 
previous entities.  See Figure 1 for an evolutionary model of the Garage Entrepreneurship 
that I study. 
In this model, the technological development occurs as variations in the environment.  
Each variation is an opportunity for a new firm but the specifics of the invention process is 
outside of the scope of this dissertation.  Conditional on invention, the garage inventor then 
patents the technology having identified the possible opportunity.  Then, different factors will 
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affect the process after opportunity identification as the inventor decides to form a new 
venture or not in order to capitalize on the invention.  Following this decision, the market 
acts as the retention mechanism and provides feedback whether the firm should continue to 
exist and how successful it will be.  This leads to evaluating the selection mechanisms that 
expand the technological variations into entrepreneurial ventures. 
Primarily, I am investigating the difference between the inventors who turned into 
entrepreneurs and those who did not.  I develop the dataset initially from the USPTO patent 
grants to non-affiliated inventors.  For example, during 1980 – 2009, on average 15% of total 
patents are non-assigned. 
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CHAPTER 3: THEORY AND HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT 
 
Entrepreneurship is based on identification and exploitation of opportunities (Shane 
and Venkataraman, 2000).  The discovery or creation of a new technology creates the 
opportunity.  Given the model under evaluation, the inventor has shown awareness of the 
opportunity but different factors can increase the awareness of market value and potential 
opportunity (Kirzner, 1973) or otherwise prompt the inventor to action in attempting to 
commercialize the technology (Mollick, 2012). 
To answer the question of what factors prompts the garage inventor to become a 
garage entrepreneur (Amit, Glosten, and Muller, 1993), I first investigate characteristics of 
the social environment in which the potential entrepreneurs are embedded.  I then develop 
arguments on the product and competitive environment at the time of the invention. 
Social Opportunity Space 
The types of resources a potential entrepreneur brings can be critical for firm survival 
and long-term success (Alvarez and Busenitz, 2001; Kerr, Kerr, and Nanda, 2015).  Besides 
physical resources, the sociological foundations of entrepreneurship highlight the people, 
networks and institutional environment to which nascent entrepreneurs have access as critical 
drivers of action and ultimate success (Aldrich and Ruef, 2006; Nanda and Sørensen, 2010; 
Thornton, 1999).  One of the important elements of networks is access to technical and 
market knowledge and experience.  It is important to note that in this context, independent 
invention does not mean that the inventor is working alone or has never worked with other 
individuals.  For this study, independent invention means that the inventor or inventors 
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developed the technology outside of a work relationship with a firm, university or other 
organization that can claim ownership over the focal technology. 
The focal invention is developed outside of these affiliations.  However, it can be 
developed by a team or by individuals who have worked in teams prior to the focal 
independent technology.  Leveraging knowledge gained from prior affiliations can help them 
overcome tacitness of external knowledge (Kogut and Zander, 1993), a valuable condition as 
most knowledge will be outside of the individual inventor without a formal affiliation.  The 
knowledge required for successful innovations that are more likely to be radical and valuable 
as described above can therefore come from the size of the network even if not directly from 
the focal technology.  For technologies actually developed by multiple inventors, each 
inventor can have unique knowledge and experiences (Gruber, MacMillan, and Thompson, 
2013; Haas and Hansen, 2007).   
If the inventors are strongly linked, the inventors will have access to nearly the same 
knowledge (Granovetter, 1973) and the invention could be limited in its value.  However, if 
the inventors have different networks, one new path can open access to very different new 
knowledge that can be turned into value.  As knowledge from different areas are recombined 
together, the likelihood of success increases.  Focusing on more than just the size of the 
network, garage entrepreneurs will have networks of co-inventors with a variety of 
knowledge expertise.  As the number of inventors increase, the likelihood of having new 
knowledge increases (Jones, 2009).  Therefore, I hypothesize the positive effects of the size 
of the inventive network: 
Hypothesis 1: Garage inventors are more likely to become garage entrepreneurs as 
they are professionally connected to more inventors.  
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Technological Opportunity Space 
“I fear someone in a garage who is devising something completely new.” 
Bill Gates (1998: as described by Grossman, 2012) in response to a question as to which 
competitor he feared most. 
 The innovative process is frequently seen as recombining prior knowledge in order to 
achieve novel combinations (Schumpeter, 1934; Spender and Grant, 1996).  Incumbent firms 
are more likely to start working on process innovations (Cohen and Klepper, 1992, 1996a) 
and produce technological innovations that are very similar to their existing technologies 
(Helfat, 1994).  Opportunities can also exist when actors specifically hold different views on 
the value of the technology.  Even if incumbents were aware of a potential technological 
opportunity, they may not pursue it because they do not understand the importance of the 
technology – which will be more difficult as the technology becomes more radical and harder 
to evaluate – or that it is not economically important for them.   
New technological categories are likely to emerge from new and small firms (Prusa 
and Schmitz Jr., 1991).  Partially, this could be a function of the selection mechanism by 
inventor/entrepreneurs.  Regardless of the technologies the independent inventors actually 
create, they are more likely to evaluate the opportunity as important if the idea is radical and 
potentially significant (Gans et al., 2002).  If the idea is simple, inventors may recognize 
some small value but will not pursue the technology commercially.  Additionally, 
incremental innovations that are not radical are more likely to be tied to existing technologies 
that are controlled by the existing incumbent firms.  This will discourage inventors either 
cognitively as they evaluate the opportunity or rationally as they understand that the 
complementary products are not under their control and they will have a difficult time selling 
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the enhancement.  Entrepreneurs are also more likely to commercialize inventions 
themselves as the scope of the patents increases (Nerkar and Shane, 2007; Shane, 2001a).  
Under conditions of broad technological application, the opportunities will increase as the 
inventor can see markets in different areas (Shane, 2000) that the technology can be applied.  
Altogether, these arguments suggest that radicalness and significance of the technology will 
increase the rate of entrepreneurship amongst garage inventors.   
 Small, entrepreneurial firms, especially those started by independent inventors, will 
not have significant amounts of excess resources in order to compete broadly.  They are best 
able to enter when small, niche market opportunities are available (Gans and Stern, 2003; 
Katila and Shane, 2005).  By targeting niche markets, the independent inventors will be able 
to gain experience and perfect their products while not experiencing the full competitive 
pressures (Christensen, 1997).  As the availability of niche markets increase, even if 
incumbent firms identify the opportunity, they may not see the profitability compared to their 
existing market (Bhide, 1992; Christensen and Bower, 1996).  As the market concentration 
increases, existing firms will be more competitive and likely to respond to external events 
(Turner, Mitchell, and Bettis, 2010).  With such concentration, independent firms may not be 
able to identify the market opportunities for smaller technological products. 
 Higher fragmentation creates more ambiguity in the market, an area where startups 
can maneuver to find a competitive position.  Market segmentation is related to customers’ 
willingness for differentiation (Shane, 2001b).  Some technologies will allow different 
attributes to be highlighted from different firms.  In established technological industries, 
firms will follow the product characteristics valued by their large customers, allowing the 
possibility for niches to exist for small firms (Christensen, 1997).      
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 These niches may exist as a large number of competitors are present in the 
environment (Katila and Shane, 2005) and similarly when the industry concentration is small 
(Nerkar and Shane, 2003).  Niches are particularly relevant as incumbents are not able to 
serve the fringe users and new companies can test their products with little direct competition 
(Malerba et al., 2007).  Therefore, I hypothesize that the presence of market niches, or areas 
of less competition for inventors, will be related to inventors starting new ventures to 
commercialize their inventions. 
Hypothesis 2: Garage inventors are less likely to become garage entrepreneurs as the 
competition in the technological space increases. 
Geographical Opportunity Space 
Another sociological factor includes the startup activity in the area (Konczal, 2013).  
As the amount of startup activity in the area increases, entrepreneurship is more likely to be 
visible as their friends or colleagues start to engage in entrepreneurship (Kacperczyk, 2013; 
Roach and Sauermann, 2015).  With increased startup activity, specialized resources 
dedicated to supporting such activity could increase which will allow for easier access by 
other potential startups. 
With a large amount of entrepreneurship in an area, it is also more likely that the 
inventor is connected with someone who has entrepreneurial experience.  This connection 
will help encourage entrepreneurship as connections will demonstrate to the inventor that 
starting his or her own business is an option for the technology (Roach and Sauermann, 
2015).  These connections can serve to evaluate the ideas for entrepreneurial potential and 
directly connect the inventor with other necessary resources.   
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Even without the direct connection, a wave of entrepreneurship in the area can 
equally serve to encourage the inventor to consider firm formation (Freeman, 1986; 
Thornton, 1999).  This has been seen similarly in acquisition waves (Stearns and Allan, 
1996; Thornton, 1995).  The startup activity and social pressures can serve to promote 
entrepreneurship regardless of the actual quality difference in the invention.  Therefore, I 
suggest that startup activity will increasingly promote entrepreneurship from the set of garage 
inventors. 
Hypothesis 3: Garage inventors are more likely to become garage entrepreneurs as 
incidence of entrepreneurship in their geographical area increases. 
Experience 
 Entrepreneurial opportunities exist when the existing actors having different ideas of 
the potential value of an opportunity (Kirzner, 1973), are cognitively not able to recognize 
the opportunities, possibly because of their existing knowledge structure (Shane, 2000), or 
when the opportunities are created by luck or foresight through the recombination of 
previous ideas (Schumpeter, 1934).   
 Social and organizational connections serve to cull ideas earlier (Singh and Fleming, 
2010) and provide feedback as new ideas develop.  Without such connections, the alternative 
is for the inventor to develop the ideas and obtain feedback once new technologies are 
developed.  This process of experiential learning increases the skill at patenting good 
technologies, claiming the required technological area to allow the inventor to commercialize 
it later.  The feedback also improves the product that the inventor is providing before the 
inventor makes the decision to start a new firm with his existing technological portfolio.   
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 Further, organizations are repositories of technologies, associated resources, and 
stored and tacit knowledge accumulated over time related to their technological portfolio 
(Spender and Grant, 1996).  A single independent patent defines the start of a technological 
trajectory but the inventor will need a fuller portfolio in order to increase their confidence of 
survival and economic viability (Somaya, 2012).  Therefore, as an inventor both improves on 
the technology and builds a thicket of patents more capable of protecting the technological 
area, thereby increasing expected economic returns, the inventor is more likely to engage in 
entrepreneurship:   
 Hypothesis 4: Garage inventors are more likely to become garage entrepreneurs as 
their inventive experience increases. 
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CHAPTER 4: DATA AND METHODOLOGY 
 
In order to study the phenomenon of technological entrepreneurship by garage 
inventors, I study the transition from inventor to entrepreneur by operationalizing a garage 
inventor as an inventor in the patent database whose first patent is independently owned by 
the focal inventor and he or she has no recorded working history with an existing 
organization from the patent database.  This is likely to capture those firms that have the 
potential to be vibrant additions to the economy.  Patents have been shown as valuable 
resources for entrepreneurial companies (Hsu and Ziedonis, 2013) and as able to increase 
likelihood of receiving venture capital funding (Hsu, 2006; Stuart, Hoang, and Hybels, 
1999). 
Sample and Data 
Using the Harvard Patent Dataverse (Lai et al., 2013) from 1980 to 2010, I identify 
the individuals who develop their first patent without an organizational assignee.  This data is 
useful as it was designed to disambiguate inventors specifically to enable the study of 
inventor mobility in the database (Marx, Strumsky, and Fleming, 2009) which is similar to 
identifying the transition from independent inventor to entrepreneur.  Figure 2 represents the 
trend of independent inventors patenting within the USPTO during a sample of the time 
under analysis for this dissertation.  
Since the goal of my study is to understand the entrepreneurship founding process, 
use of a longitudinal panel could create an issue of sampling on the dependent variable, 
leading to issues with the validity of the results.  As such, I follow the studies of Ahuja and 
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Lampert (2001) and Nerkar and Paruchuri (2005) by following the entire cohort using a 
hazard model to allow censoring in yearly spells.   
Censoring in this case represents right censored data whereby the entry is known but 
the exact exit point for the inventor is unknown.  Once an inventor becomes an entrepreneur, 
the exit event is clear.  Alternatively, I remove inventors after 20 years from the date of their 
last patent.  After such a time, I have reasonable confidence that they are unlikely to start a 
firm based on the technology.  Not only has a significant amount of time passed but per the 
legal timeline of the patent grant, their patent has expired.  If the technology had value, the 
inventor no longer has an exclusivity right.  While the model could be run as true continuous 
time, the yearly spells allow for updating the independent variables that vary with time for 
the inventor.  Therefore, any year that ends with no known entrepreneurship event, the 
inventor is said to be right-censored.  The inventor is therefore still in the analysis but the 
research methodology then allows me to empirically deal with their presence but unknown 
outcome.  This is therefore different from clearly saying that inventor has not founded a firm.  
Censoring allows for such a distinction empirically. 
I follow patenting inventors without corporate pre-history who applied for at least one 
granted patent after 1980. With a patenting pre-history to 1975, I can examine their 
background and history as well as have a robust timeline to follow their future career.  This 
results in an initial risk-set of just under 190,000 technologies by nearly 225,000 unique 
garage inventors in the United States, which could be used to form a new venture.  I develop 
the method to track the garage inventors and their subsequent patents to understand which 
were later owned by a new venture. Table 1 presents high-level statistics representing the 
patent database and garage inventor.   
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The Appendix highlights the part of the process of evaluating firms as brand new 
entities and providing secondary verification on their founding.  After initially matching the 
data the first-level identification strategy described above, I had a sample of 7,732 new firms 
in the USPTO data associated with inventors whose first patent had been unassigned to any 
organization.  I went through the list to eliminate assignments that did not match the idea of a 
new, entrepreneurial firm.  Namely, many were assigned to another inventor, especially when 
multiple inventors were on the patent but it would be owned by one in particular.  Some 
universities’ first patents were present in this sample and were thus eliminated.  Foundations, 
trusts, institutes, and government organizations were removed if they were one of the new 
patenting organizations.  Some international companies with GmbH (Germany) or SpA 
(Italian) with American inventors were also present and therefore removed.  After this 
process, I was left with 5,780 firms.  In the final analysis that relies on full data availability, I 
have a complete sample of 5,684 new firms in the patent database and 152,092 unique garage 
inventors. 
Without controlling for any characteristics, the cumulative firm foundation 
percentage is presented in Figure 3.  The percentage is scaled based on the inventors in the 
data set that do start an entrepreneurial firm, not on the total population of inventors.  If 
scaled to the entire garage inventor list, the figure would asymptote to about 4%.  From the 
figure, we can see that 20% of inventors who start a new firm will do so in the same year as 
their initial parent.  Within five years after the garage patent, 85% of those who will become 
entrepreneurs have done so.  While I will eventually discount inventors who become 
entrepreneurs after 20 years, the figure also demonstrates that it is just under 100% of the 
future founding entrepreneurs at the expiration of their initial patent.  
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Model Specification 
I used a Cox Proportional Hazard Model of the form:  
ℎ௜(ݐ) = ߣ଴(ݐ)exp {ߚଵݔ௜ଵ + ⋯ + ߚ௞ݔ௜௞} 
where the baseline hazard function is left unspecified and the results are relative to this 
unknown and unspecified function.  Between two individuals, the ratio of hazards is then: 
ℎ௜(ݐ)
ℎ௝(ݐ) = exp൛ߚଵ൫ݔ௜ଵ − ݔ௝ଵ൯ + ⋯ + ߚ௞൫ݔ௜௞ − ݔ௝௞൯ൟ 
Further the ߣ଴(ݐ) cancels out in the ratio.  The analysis then tests a set of covariates on the 
risk of an event happening – the garage inventor engaging in entrepreneurship by patenting 
under a new technological entity. 
The data is structured as survival analysis with a yearly outcome.  I follow every 
inventor who applied for a patent 1980 onward under the proposed garage status in this 
study.  In each year, I can specify their likelihood of patenting with a new technological 
entity, whether or not they patent in the following year.  This also allows us to incorporate 
censoring for non-patenting in the outcome year.   
Independent variables are defined by the characteristics of the inventor, the patent, or 
the environment in the year prior to the dependent variable.  For yearly changing of 
independent variables, the outcome variable is always measured the year after the 
independent variable.  This lag separates the characteristics of the technological area as an 
input from the output characteristics.  I do not reset the inventor’s status mid-year to allow 
multiple positive outcomes in a year (i.e., if the inventor files for a garage entrepreneurial 
patent in January and November of 2000, the outcome would still be one for positively 
patenting under a garage entity in 2000).  While there are some repeat garage entrepreneurs, I 
remove them from the analysis once they become an entrepreneur.  Alternatively, they are 
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removed from the analysis 20 years after their last active patent has been filed.  This is the 
length of patent validity and thus highly unlikely that they would rejoin the analysis with any 
characteristics resembling the expired patent.  A simplification of the structure of the data 
used in the survival model is presented in Figure 4.  
Dependent Variable 
Garage Entrepreneurship: The dependent variable denotes whether the garage 
entrepreneur patents with a new technological entity in the focal year.  A new technological 
entity is the first occurrence of the assignee in the Harvard Patent Dataverse (Lai et al., 2013) 
as defined by the asgnum indicator which incorporates the NBER (Hall, Jaffe, and 
Trajtenberg, 2001) pdpass into their own fuzzy string algorithm for disambiguation.  This is 
similar to a definition used by Malerba and Orsenigo (1999) broadly on technological entry 
in new classes in the European patent data but is being applied to the first patent ever by a 
firm.  Only the very first patent instance of the assignee is considered the entrepreneurial 
event and I consider any inventor on that patent to be the entrepreneur on record.  If the 
garage inventor is associated with such a patent, then the dependent variable in the hazard 
model is triggered.  All other outcomes including non-patenting, filing another independent 
patent, or filing a patent under an existing organization are considered censored events.  No 
characteristics of the entrepreneurial patent are used for the analysis other than its presence or 
absence and independent variables are not updated when the patent is developed. 
Independent Variables 
For all variables, independent and dependent, patents were classified as occurring in 
the application year of the patent when determining the timing and characteristics for each 
variable.  
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Number of Inventors:  The first independent variable is the number of inventors on 
the patent under analysis.  The “garage” status is defined at an inventor level while each 
patent may have multiple inventors and the analysis is done at the inventor level.  Once an 
inventor has a patent, this is a time-invariant characteristic in the hazard model until the 
inventor develops a further patent.  If the inventor develops a further patent, the characteristic 
is immediately updated on the basis of his most recent patent and is used going forward. If 
more than one inventor has “garage status” on the patent, then the first listed inventor is used.   
Other Unique Inventor Ties:  This variable is the number of unique inventors 
directly connected to the team of inventors prior to the patent under analysis.  For a patent 
with one inventor, this represents the total number of other inventors he has worked with 
prior to this event.  For a patent with a team of inventors, this is the cumulative unique 
inventors, separate from the focal team, that are connected to the inventors on this patent.  
Together with Number of Inventors, these variables represent a first and second degree strong 
social connection through which knowledge and information can be transferred.  This 
variable is only updated with the generation of further patents with different network ties.   
Inventor Experience: Experience is measured in the cumulative number of successful 
patent applications by the focal inventor.  This is automatically set as the value from the 
previous year until a new patent is developed, at which time the variable is updated through 
the end of the current observation spell.  This value is transformed for the model as 
ln(experience). 
Firm Herfindahl:  To operationalize the concentration in the technological 
opportunity space, I utilize the Herfindahl index (HHI) of firm patent ownership in the 
primary patent technological class. The Herfindahl index was originally used to calculate 
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market share for competition and antitrust law but has also been used for technology 
management. I create the Herfindahl index by examining the ‘market share’ of the different 
assignees in the technological space in a given year.  A higher Herfindahl index would 
suggest that a few firms are dominant in the technological area.  For this analysis, I multiply 
the traditional calculation by ten in order to scale the variable from 0 to 10 to have a finer 
understanding of the concentration, especially for interpreting results.  The calculation for 
HHI is: 
ܪܪܫ௜௧ = ෍ ቀ
݊௜௝௧
ܰ ቁ
ଶ௃
௝ୀଵ
∗ 10, 
where i is the primary technological class and j is each existing organization that patented in 
that technological area in year t;  n is the number of patents assigned to the organization and 
N is the total number of patents.  
Independent Inventors in Technological Area:  The complement of current 
competition in the technological area is the potential competition in the technological area.  
Especially from the perspective of a current independent inventor evaluating the 
technological opportunity, the inventor can determine how many potential entrants there are 
by the number of patents assigned to independent inventors – those that are similar to him 
have the potential to become an entrant.  This variable is measured as the log transformed 
number of independent patents in the technological area in the previous year. 
Previous Affiliation:  The dummy variable where one in previous affiliation 
recognizes whether an inventor has, at that point in time, ever patented with an existing 
organization and zero represents never having been affiliated with an organization up to the 
analysis time.  Every inventor under this analysis started his or her patenting career 
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independent of any organization.  However, it is possible for garage inventors to join an 
existing organization prior to becoming an entrepreneur.  This dummy captures the transition 
to employee that may bring resources that non-affiliated inventors still do not have.   
Size of Previous Affiliations:  To further understand the significance of any prior 
organizational affiliations, this variable measures the maximum size of any prior 
organizational affiliation as calculated by the log of the number of patents owned by the 
organization at the time of inventor affiliation.  Once an inventor works with a corporate 
affiliation, this becomes a stable characteristic of the inventor for all future observation 
spells.  Depending on which regression model, this is valued at zero if the inventor has no 
prior organizational affiliation or is left out of the model as blank when evaluating 
organizational affiliation separate from the whole sample. 
Venture Capital Deals in the State: One defining characteristic of the geographical 
opportunity space is the potential for outside funding which is a significant indicator for 
technological firms in particular (Hsu and Ziedonis, 2013; Stuart et al., 1999).  The data is 
collected by the National Venture Capital Association (Franklin and Taylor, 2015) and 
Thomson Reuters that records the information and makes it available in their Stats and 
Studies Yearbook.  This variable is the log of the total number of venture capital deals in the 
inventor’s state in the focal year.  
MSA Entry Rate:  Further representing the geographical area, the Census Business 
Dynamics Statistics (US Census Bureau Center for Economic Studies, 2015) allows 
measurement of aggregated business dynamics information on a yearly basis built from the 
confidential Longitudinal Business Database.  The entry rate is measured at the Metropolitan 
Statistical Area (MSA) and provided by the BDS.  It is originally calculated as 100 * 
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(number establishments entering in the year divided by the average number of establishments 
in the MSA).     
MSA Exit Rate:  The exit rate is determined in the same way as the entry rate but is 
measured as 100 * (the number of establishments that exited the area divided by the average 
number in existence in the year).  Research highlights the opportunity for new firm 
development based on the closing of existing firms, unintentionally allowing existing firms 
to spin off their knowledge as entrepreneurial firms (Carnahan, 2013; Hoetker and Agarwal, 
2007). 
Time Since Invention:  This variable is measured in years since the inventor’s last 
patent.  The Hazard Model tests the age of the patent and this time-based likelihood of 
engaging in technological entrepreneurship. 
Controls 
Additionally, I control for a few additional characteristics that are related to the 
independent variables or are theoretically relevant to the experience of the inventors: 
Claims: This is the log of the number of claims on the patent.  Claims has been used 
as a proxy for the significance of the technology and is correlated with the economic value 
(Nerkar and Paruchuri, 2005; Tong and Frame, 1994).   
Five-year Citations:  Both as a possible measure of significance and as a feedback 
mechanism, I include a rolling five-year citation rate indicating the total number of citations 
in the last five years that the inventor’s patents have received prior to the focal year.  This 
measure proxies for technological significance (Ahuja and Lampert, 2001) and offers the 
inventor feedback as to how and in what way other entities are using the inventor’s 
technology. 
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Originality:   The originality is a characteristic of the technology defined by the 
nature of the references on the patent (Hall et al., 2001) which represents the concentration of 
technological classes in the backward citations of the patent:  
ܱݎ݈݅݃݅݊ܽ݅ݐݕ௜ = 1 − ෍ ݏ௜௝ଶ
௡೔
௝
, 
where ݏ௜௝ denotes the percentage of citations made by patent i that belong to class j.  This is 
similar to the Herfindahl index and describes how broadly this technology connects to 
different technological areas.  This is a time-invariant characteristic but is updated if the 
inventor develops a further patent. 
Backward Citations:  The number of backward citations is a relevant control with the 
originality measure and is another indicator of the amount of knowledge recombined in the 
focal technology (Fleming, 2001).  This is a time-invariant characteristic but is updated if the 
inventor develops a further patent. 
Male:  The gender of the inventor is determined by matching the inventor name and 
year to the Social Security Administration data on social security applications in each year. 
(Social Security Administration, 2014).  Patenting is predominantly performed by males 
(Hunt et al., 2013) and gender may affect the decision to engage in entrepreneurship 
following the invention and patenting (Delmar and Davidsson, 2000; Kuppuswamy and 
Mollick, 2015).  
New Firms in Database: The nature of new startup firms may have a time-varying 
nature specific to technological firms and the patent database.  The log of (1+number of new 
firms in the entire patent database) in that year is included as a control for the market trends 
in entrepreneurship in general and the manner in which such firms were started in the patent 
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database.  This measures the number of new firms regardless of inventor garage status or 
whether those firms were directly measured as an outcome for this study. 
Lawyer:  As a proxy for resources, the lawyer variable is a dummy indicating 
whether the inventor utilized a lawyer to file the patent.  This expense is not strictly required 
and the lawyer information is included on the patent.  This data is available for all patent 
grants from 1998 onward and is from the Harvard Patent Dataverse (Lai et al., 2013).   
Zillow Estimate of Home Value:  Lastly, as another proxy for resources available to 
the potential entrepreneur (Jensen, Leth-Petersen, and Nanda, 2015; Kerr et al., 2015), the 
estimate of the inventor’s personal home was collected using the inventor address and the 
website Zillow.com which proceeds home value estimates as well as general market 
conditions over time (Zillow.com, 2015).  Home values for the set of garage inventors who 
started their careers in 2005 were collected and the value of the house fluctuated on the basis 
of local conditions in the zip code of the inventor. 
  
31 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CHAPTER 5: RESULTS 
 
The main summary statistics are presented in Table 2.  The correlations are presented 
in Table 3 and Table 4.  The variables presented below are the primary independent 
variables.  Most count variables will be logged due to the skewness present in their 
distributions. 
Summary Statistics 
A second set of summary statistics is presented in Table 5 that presents the summary 
statistics based on entrepreneurship condition.  Part of this study is to document and explore 
the entrepreneurial activity in the patenting database in general related to garage 
inventorship.  Table 6 and Figure 5 through Figure 8 help visualize the location of garage 
inventors and entrepreneurs representing the total number of inventors or entrepreneurs, 
respectively, in the state between 1980 and 2009 or the number weighted by the average 
population of the state during this timeframe.  Again, garage inventors are counted if their 
first patent in the USPTO database is independent of an assignee organization.  The garage 
entrepreneur data is based on the definition within this dissertation of the subset of garage 
entrepreneurs who subsequently produce the first patent for a brand new assignee within the 
USPTO data.  California, New York, Florida, and Texas are the most prominent areas by raw 
number of both inventors and entrepreneurs.  When weighted by population, New York, 
Virginia, Massachusetts, New Jersey, Alabama, and North Carolina are the top six 
inventorship areas with a rate above 2,000 garage inventors per million residents.  Finally, 
New York, Virginia, Massachusetts, and New Jersey, all have a rate of garage entrepreneurs 
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above 150 per million residents; and North Carolina, Wisconsin, Alabama, Arizona, Utah 
and Mississippi all have a rate of garage entrepreneurs above 50 per million residents.  
Main Results 
The Cox Proportional Hazard Model is a continuous time model that relates how the 
risk of an event – in this case, the patenting under a new technological entity – to the 
underlying hazard function (Allison, 1995).  Hazard rates relative to the baseline are 
presented.  To obtain the coefficients on the variables, calculate the natural log of the hazard 
rate (i.e., for Inventor Experience in Model 1, the coefficient would be ln(2.068) = 0.727).  
This is a proportional hazard rate where a value above 1.0 represents an increased likelihood 
of the event occurring and a value below 1.0 represents a decreased likelihood of the event 
happening.  
Table 7 presents the results of the Cox Hazard Models with Model 1 representing the 
full analysis period from 1980–2009.  I present the asterisks for reference but the tables also 
contain standard errors to help further understand significance levels (Bettis et al., 2016).   
The Number of Inventors is positive with an odds ratio of 1.194 (se = 0.008,  
p < 0.001).  As the number of inventors on the garage patent increases by 1, the likelihood of 
the garage inventor becoming an entrepreneur increases by 19.4%.  Similarly, as the Prior 
Unique Ties of Inventors increases, the likelihood of becoming an entrepreneur increases by 
15.7% (hazard ratio = 1.157, se = 0.009, p < 0.001).  Together, these highlight the positive 
effect of strong network ties in the social opportunity space, either through direct co-
invention in the previous patent or indirect connections by the focal inventor’s prior 
patenting history or the second-degree connections brought by the co-inventor. 
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With regard to the technological opportunity space, the effects of current and 
potential competitors is most obviously noticed.  The Herfindahl concentration is negative 
with a reduction in likelihood of just over 30% for a one unit change in the concentration in 
this industry.  The Herfindahl index, usually presented from 0 to 1 was rescaled from 0 to 10 
to highlight the gradations.  Therefore, a unit change is equal to a 10% increase in 
concentration, reducing the likelihood of entry by a significant amount (hr = 0.692, se = 
0.038, p<0.001).  This represents the current competitive landscape in the technological 
space.  Alternatively, garage inventors could look at the area and determine the potential 
competitors by including the number of garage inventors in their evaluation of the 
technological space.  The log of the number of independent inventors in the technological 
space is negative and significant (hr = 0.890, se = 0.014, p<0.001).  As the number of 
potential entrants as independent inventors increases by one standard deviation, the 
likelihood of entrepreneurship reduces by 11%.   
Next, I evaluate the results for the opportunity space as defined by the inventor’s 
geography.  As the number of venture capital deals in the inventor’s state increases by one 
standard deviation, the likelihood of the inventor generating an entrepreneurial patent 
increases by 3.5% (hr = 1.035, se = 0.009, p<0.001).  This is not a direct measure of capital 
infusion to businesses but a proxy for financial capital that could be available in the area and 
interest in technological startups.  This still shows a positive effect of the amount of interest 
in technology businesses around the entrepreneur.  Next, as the rate of entry of new 
establishments in the inventor’s MSA increases, the inventor is likely to become an 
entrepreneur with an increased risk of 2.4% (hr = 1.024, se = 0.008, p = 0.003).  The exit 
rate of establishments in the inventor’s MSA however is not significant (hr = 0.987, 
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se=0.012, p=0.309), suggesting that the entrepreneurial event is not driven by the closing of 
existing local establishments.  This dichotomy in particular highlights the positive benefits of 
entrepreneurial growth in the area of the inventor.  
Next, I discuss the results of increase in experience for the garage inventors.  Each 
inventor under analysis begins with a single patent and no previous organizational 
affiliations.  As the inventor patents more technologies, they are significantly more likely to 
become entrepreneurs at a rate of 108% (hr = 2.068, se = 0.056, p < 0.001) as they increase 
their patent portfolio by one standard deviation.  Next, if the focal inventors joins an existing 
firm, they are also more likely to spin back out and become an entrepreneur with an 
increased hazard of 94% (hr = 1.936, se = 0.112, p < 0.001).    The characteristic of this 
process is also started to be tested as the size of the organization’s patent store.  Namely, as 
the number of patents owned by the organization increased by one standard deviation, the 
likelihood of becoming a garage entrepreneur decreases by 24% (hr = 0.763, se = 0.010,  
p < 0.001).  Lastly, the time since invention is negative with a hazard ratio of 0.935  
(se = 0.004, p < 0.001).  The likelihood of becoming an entrepreneur decreases with time, 
which matches the raw pattern seen in Figure 3.   
Finally, I will discuss the control variables presented in the model.  The first set 
control for various patent-level characteristics.  The log of the number of claims on the patent 
increases the likelihood of the inventor generating an entrepreneurial patent by 37% (hr = 
1.367, se = 0.023, p<0.001).  The five-year citation rate of the garage patent does not 
significantly affect the entrepreneurial rate (hr = 0.999, se = 0.003, p = 0.812).  However, 
the originality score does increase the likelihood of become an entrepreneur by 27% (hr = 
1.270, se = 0.063, p < 0.001).   Each additional backward citation included in the original 
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patent also slightly increases the likelihood of the inventor becoming an entrepreneur (hr = 
1.003, se = 0.001, p < 0.001).  Even despite the majority of patentees being male to begin 
with (91%), males were 119% more likely to move forward toward entrepreneurship 
(hr=2.185, se=0.137, p<0.001) than females in this population.  Lastly, the presence of new 
firms in the patent database in that year, representing further patenting and entrepreneurial 
activity in the times, also significantly increases the likelihood of the inventor producing an 
entrepreneurial patent by an increase of 198% (hr = 2.975, se = 0.266, p < 0.001) with a one 
standard deviation increase in the number of new firms in the year.  
Note that about 4% of the subjects within this analysis become entrepreneurs (5,684 
garage entrepreneurs out of the 152,092 garage inventors included in Model 1).  This rate 
differs from the overall statistics presented in Table 1 based on the availability of data for the 
full model and decisions to cull as described in the methodology section.   
Subsample Analyses 
I run four more models to elaborate on the results of Model 1.  Specifically, next I 
break out the analysis as Table 8 into Model 2 and Model 3, which separates inventors who, 
respectively, never become affiliated with an existing firm prior to their final results from 
those who do join an existing firm.  Model 2 presents the analysis for the garage inventors 
who do not join an existing firm.  The outcome is either an entrepreneurial event, triggering a 
1 in the dependent variable, or censored, triggering a zero.  Model 3 is for the subset of 
garage inventors who will join an existing firm at some point prior to their removal from the 
analysis.  The majority of garage inventors (93%) do not join an existing firm as they 
develop patenting experience.     
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Model 2 mirrors the effects in model 1 but excludes the firm affiliation variables.  
Directionally, all the main effects operate in the same predicted manner.  The main results 
are slightly more pronounced without those that will join a firm.  For example, there is a 
slight increase in the importance of the inventor connections, a hazard ratio of 1.265 as 
compared to 1.194 previously, and inventor experience.  A new co-inventor on the focal 
patent now increases the hazard to 1.265 (se = 0.006, p < 0.001).  If one co-inventor is 
added, the likelihood of the non-affiliated inventors to become an entrepreneur increases by 
nearly 27% as compared to 19% in the full model.  Similarly, a prior outside connection to 
the patenting team increases the likelihood of a garage inventor becoming a garage 
entrepreneur by 20% (hr = 1.202, se = 0.009, p < 0.001) rather than 15.7% from Model 1.  
These effects start to indicate the effects of the corporate affiliation in the other sample.  The 
importance of inventive experience is slightly enhanced with a 120% benefit (hr = 2.196, se 
= 0.070, p < 0.001) while it was still a very strong 107% increase in the base model. 
Model 3 is the subset of inventors who will become affiliated with an existing 
organization during their patenting career.  This represents about 7% of the garage inventors 
from the initial sample.  The main effect is that corporate affiliation after a garage invention 
but before the entrepreneurial decision mutes many of the other hypothesized effects.  The 
number of inventors is now negative (hr=0.952, se=0.021, p = 0.022), reducing the 
likelihood of becoming an entrepreneur by 5% as a direct co-inventor tie is added rather than 
the 19% positive effect in model 1.  Other second order ties is still positive but at a rate of 
4.2% increase (hr = 1.042, se = 0.020, p = 0.033) rather than the initial results of 16%. The 
technological competition space is no longer significant as measured by firm concentration or 
number of independent inventors in the area but still negative for the Herfindahl (hr = 0.835, 
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se = 0.117, p = 0,198).  The total number of other independent inventors in the technological 
space is positive but with a 95% confidence interval that would range from 0.957 to 1.097.  
Finally, inventor experience is still positive with a 65% (hr = 1.648, se = 0.112, p<0.001) 
rather than 116% in the full model.  For this model, I also highlight the size of the affiliation.  
As the firm size decreases, measured by the log of the number of patents at the time of 
affiliation, the more likely the initial garage inventor is likely to later become an entrepreneur 
by nearly 9% (hr = 0.913, se = 0.011, p < 0.001).  This suggests that inventors who join 
larger firms are more likely to stay with their new affiliation, whereas the smaller the firm, 
the more likely the inventor is to change organizations again, and particularly to a new 
patenting organization. 
When split into the subsamples, 3.3% of the non-affiliated inventors will become 
entrepreneurs and 8.7% of those that start as garage inventors but then join an established 
firm are likely to spin back out again and become entrepreneurs in the sample.  This could 
partially be seen by the previous affiliation variable in model 1 but is also present in the raw 
breakouts from the samples in Models 2 and 3. 
Models 4 and 5, presented in Table 9, are designed to include proxies of personal 
financial resources available to the garage inventor.  Model 4 includes the dummy lawyer 
indicating whether the inventor hired a lawyer to file the garage patent.  This is not required 
for patents but could be valuable for the quality.  This also demonstrates ability of the 
inventor to pay for a lawyer to guide them through the process and may indicate an increased 
preliminary motivation for a more formal business relationship later.  The presence of a 
lawyer on a garage patent increases the likelihood of becoming an entrepreneur by 58%  
(hr = 1.579, se = 0.111, p < 0.001) while qualitatively leaving all the main effects constant.  
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This information is only available for patents granted after 1998 due to USPTO data 
availability on the measure and represents half of the initial set of garage inventors from 
Model 1. 
Lastly, Model 5 consists of preliminary results looking at an alternative measure of 
resources that is not affected by the entrepreneurial intentions at the time of the first patent.  
Data was collected from the set of garage inventors who began their career in 2005.  I was 
able to identify home value estimates for half of the 5,600 inventors under this condition.  
The estimate of the inventor’s personal home, allowed to fluctuate each year based on the 
economic conditions in the inventor’s home zip code, has some evidence for the positive 
relationship to transition into entrepreneurship (hr = 1.427, se = 0.369, p = 0.100).  Due to 
the extreme reduction in observations, statistical confidence intervals become quite large for 
nearly all the main effects, dropping below traditional statistical significance levels except 
for the prior connections of the patenting inventors. 
Alternative Specifications 
Two additional tests are completed to demonstrate the effects from Table 7.  Table 10 
presents the interactions included in the model.  Models 2 and 3 (Table 8) split the sample 
but the majority of the inventors are still present in Model 2, resulting in loss of precision 
around estimates for those that join a firm.  The full interaction model in Table 10 interacts 
with the main hypothesized variables with the move to an established organization and runs 
the full model.  The interactions are included at the top for readability.  All the main effects 
in Model 6 remain qualitatively the same, as seen in Model 2.  However, the interactions 
highlight the organizational effects of the accumulated affiliation experience with much 
higher clarity and statistical confidence.  One additional co-inventor on a focal patent within 
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an existing organization now decreases the inventor’s likelihood of becoming an 
entrepreneur by 24% (hr = 0.761, se = 0.016, p < 0.001).  An additional prior connection no 
longer helps the inventor as each additional prior connection decreases the likelihood a 
further 16% (hr = 0.840, se = 0.021, p < 0.001).  As the inventor becomes embedded in a 
network of co-authors and connections within an organization, he or she is less likely to spin 
back out.  The interaction with inventor experience is negative but statistically insignificant 
(hr = 0.930, se = 0.067, p = 0.312). 
Lastly, Model 7 in Table 11 is a time-series logistic analysis on the entrepreneurial 
outcome by an inventor.  All previous models were Cox Proportional Hazard Models that 
serve to include base time and inventor effects to the rate and likelihood of the 
entrepreneurial event.  Model 7 alternatively checks this dichotomous option.   
Once again, all the effects are qualitatively the same and significance levels are 
similar for all the main variables.  The number of inventors on the patent increases the 
likelihood by 19% (odds ratio = 1.193, se = 0.008, p < 0.001), which is right in line with 
Model 1.  Prior Unique Ties increase the entrepreneurial likelihood by 14% (or = 1.140, se = 
0.010, p < 0.001) as compared to nearly 16% originally.  The inventive experience is highly 
significant with a 146% increased likelihood (or = 2.457, se = 0.052, p < 0.001), whereas it 
had a hazard rate of 2.068 originally.  The previous affiliation is also significantly present in 
the logistic model with a 150% increased odds (or = 2.491, se = 0.134, p < 0.001) as 
compared to the still original value of 94%.   
This model does not separate out the entry and exit rates in the same manner as 
Model 1, demonstrating an increased likelihood of entrepreneurship as the general 
entrepreneurship rate increase (or = 1.022, se = 0.007) but also as the rate of existing firms 
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decrease or = 1.052, se = 0.010, p < 0.001).  The results of this test brings back the 
theoretical possibility that it is not simply sociological causes of entrepreneurship or even 
positive externalities to entrepreneurial areas and resources that promote the transition.  In 
this case, entrepreneurs may be able to attach themselves to potential cofounders as existing 
companies close down and employees, existing firm resources, and knowledge are released 
into the environment (Carnahan, 2013; Hoetker and Agarwal, 2007). 
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CHAPTER 6: DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
 
Contributions 
This dissertation started with the notable idea of the heroic “garage entrepreneur”.  
The image pervades not only the entrepreneurship culture but also the broader American 
culture that even Cadillac has called on it and its entrepreneurs to represent their message 
stating “you never know what kind of greatness can come out of an American garage” 
(AutoMoby, 2013; Ecclestone, 2014).  I use the broad construct to determine the ultimate 
definition of a technological entrepreneur who started through independent invention.  This 
enables me to address entrepreneurship and technology strategy theory with clear data 
identification mechanisms. 
This dissertation overcame some of the classic problems of entrepreneurship research 
(Low and MacMillan, 1988) by identifying an entrepreneurial risk-set for the level of 
analysis and suggesting different theoretical perspectives that affect the likelihood of 
becoming an entrepreneur.  I started the study asking what factors are associated with the 
likelihood of a garage inventor becoming a garage entrepreneur, particularly proposing that 
the opportunity space that the inventor operates in is related to such a transition.  Conditional 
on already having developed a garage technology in a particular technological space, the 
competitive conditions in that space motivate the inventor to transition to entrepreneurship.  
Particularly, if stronger, more concentrated firms operate in the space, the inventor is less 
likely to proceed to entrepreneurship.  As the space increases in potential competition 
through other independent inventors, the garage inventor is also less likely to proceed.   
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Next, the geographical area contributes to the opportunity space of the potential 
entrepreneurs.  As entrepreneurship is “in the air” as measured by the rate of any type of 
establishment entry in the entrepreneur’s geographical area, the garage inventor is more 
likely to transition to entrepreneurship through a patent with a new technological entity.  This 
likelihood is not affected by the exit rate of establishments in the inventor’s area.  Further, as 
a meaningful metric for potential technological firms, as the number of venture capital deals 
in the state that the inventor lives increases, the inventor is also more likely to become an 
entrepreneur.   
The third opportunity space, social structure, is also highly important in the transition 
from inventor to entrepreneur.  The direct and indirect inventive connections that the focal 
garage inventor has contributes to the positive likelihood of becoming an entrepreneur.   
Lastly, increased inventive experience increases the likelihood of becoming an 
entrepreneur.  This is significant as it shows an alternative method of learning that may be 
present without the organizational affiliations traditionally identified.   
This effect is highlighted more prominently when separating out the inventors who 
stay independent up to a possible entrepreneurial event as compared to those garage 
inventors who patent under an existing organization prior to the end of the analysis.  Joining 
an existing organization substitutes the need for additional direct inventive connections and 
dampens the importance of second-order connections’ increased personal patenting 
experience, while possibly providing market and competitive knowledge; thus, no longer 
making the technological competitive landscape visible from the patent database significant. 
Entrepreneurship and strategic management literature has highlighted the importance 
of prior organizational knowledge and connections (Agarwal et al., 2004; Agarwal and Shah, 
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2014; Cheyre, Klepper, and Veloso, 2015) and experience (Wadhwa et al., 2009; Wadhwa, 
Freeman, and Rissing, 2008).  This study contributes in that line highlighting the increased 
entrepreneurial likelihood of inventors following organizational affiliation.  I also contribute 
further upstream by showing earlier technical experience through patenting that demonstrates 
skills and interest in the direction.  I show that while there is double the likelihood of 
entrepreneurship for these inventors, it is driven by smaller companies first and reverses key 
effects such as network strength.  Besides patents, another modern model of the metaphorical 
garage is also “makerspaces” where individuals come together, have spaces and mechanical 
and tooling resources and encourage each other to hack new solutions to problems (Aldrich, 
2014). 
Limitations and Future Directions for Research 
 This study is not without its limitations but also not without its opportunities.  First, 
its generalizability is limited to technological entrepreneurship of this type.  Namely, for 
those entrepreneurs who develop an idea and patent the technology without clear 
organizational direction.  Patenting is expensive and takes skill itself.  Only certain 
individuals will move forward in this direction.  This was a strategic choice that provides a 
strong data-set but it is also very limiting for those who still have a solid technological idea 
but do not pursue this strategy.  Additionally, it is most appropriate for technologies that are 
well-represented in patents.  Stamps.com is one case in this dataset that was only possible 
after the Business Method patent category was established and legalized within the United 
States Patent and Trademark Office classification system.  Other technologies, even those 
with established classes, may not be well represented in this data.   
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The model within this dissertation treats the garage invention as if the inventor has 
been struck by lightning, recognizes the technology, but still does not know what to do with 
it as a business opportunity yet.  I treat the garage invention as this exogenous event, the 
variation in the selection model.  I use an identification strategy for invention and 
entrepreneurship self-contained within the USPTO database.  This limits the sample of 
garage inventors to those who have a technology that can be patented and have the resources 
and initiative to do so, even when they have not created the new business yet.  This is clearly 
undercounting the number of inventors who are developing ideas with business potential, 
even though those that are counted will be more likely to be stronger and highly valued (Hsu 
and Ziedonis, 2008, 2013) than the average venture.  The identification of an entrepreneurial 
event also has its limitations.  The assignee organization is new to the US Patent and 
Trademark Office but the second patent and the founding may not perfectly align.  This also 
does not identify the garage inventors who do not file a second patent with a new technology 
but do indeed start a firm on the basis of the first patent, thus undercounting the rate of 
entrepreneurship within the sample.       
While I have evidence of the clear distinction between the two events, this is not 
always the case.  Within the random sampling of firms, 20% were founded prior to the 
inventor’s garage patent.  This presents the long-term opportunity to verify those who had 
pre-founded their firm and understand its effect on the empirical results.  The question 
remains as to their motive for the first patent and the legal assignment decision that was 
made, particularly as they assigned a later patent to the pre-known organizational entity 
under their control.  Future research can also continue the theoretical development to blend 
the invention development and entrepreneurial decision as they become more intertwined 
45 
 
from the start and closer to the rational economic perspective of technological development 
and direction.   
 Additionally, this suggests that inventors in larger organizations with many co-
inventors and connections could become embedded and are then not spinning back out as 
entrepreneurs, at least for those who started as garage inventors.  Alternatively, this study 
presents the possibility to further explore the small firm effect (Elfenbein, Hamilton, and 
Zenger, 2010; Marx and Kacperczyk, 2015), not only as the benefits of small versus large, 
but identifying individuals who may be making the informed decisions to learn from one type 
or another, either with the goal of technical knowledge or business knowledge.   
 With this identification, there is clear possibility to understand the antecedents of this 
joining-prior-to-launching decision and exploring other aspects of the benefits of different 
organizational structures, whether as independent inventors or within organizations, as 
originally proposed by Schumpeter (1934, 1942).  Lastly, this dissertation assumes through 
the survival analysis that entrepreneurship through starting a new business is the main 
desired outcome and all other results are censored observations.  While starting to look at the 
possibility of joining an existing firm, the inventors have options to license or sell the 
developed technology to make profits off their labor too.  These also have entrepreneurial 
value and may have different performance implications, whether positive or negative, 
endogenous to nature and quality of the technology and demand opportunities.   
Implications 
This study started by recalling fundamental questions in organizational and 
entrepreneurship research – where do new organizations come from and who is at risk of 
founding those organizations?  By identifying a clear risk-set of potential entrepreneurs – 
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those inventors who independently own a patented technology – I am able to overcome the 
latter question to more directly answer the former.  The focus of this study is the 
understudied area of independent inventors who have no prior organizational patenting 
experience, called “garage inventors” and their likelihood of becoming entrepreneurs.   
I find that increased independent patenting experience and social connections can 
substitute for direct organizational affiliations in the likelihood of becoming an entrepreneur.  
Overall, the founding conditions around the technological, social, and geographical 
opportunity spaces are important in the transition from inventor to entrepreneur for the set of 
garage inventors identified in the USPTO patent database. 
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TABLES 
 
Table 1: Initial Statistics from Patent Data 
Description Number Note 
Unique garage inventors in the United States 224,907   
Unique patents created by garage inventors 188,613 
 
Some patents have multiple garage 
inventors 
 
Total patent/inventor records by garage 
inventors over their career 406,629 
 
On average, about 2 records per 
inventor 
 
Garage inventors who become associated 
with some firm 22,988 
 
10.2% of all garage inventors 
 
 
Garage inventors who become associated 
with a new firm 11,317 
49% of those who work with a firm or 
6% of all garage inventors 
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Table 2: Descriptive Statistics 
No. Variable Obs. Mean S.D. Min Max 
(1) Number of Inventors 311613 1.68 1.39 1 33 
(2) Claims 311532 14.12 12.39 1 683 
(3) Five-year Citations 311613 1.44 4.05 0 395 
(4) Originality 291180 0.37 0.29 0 1 
(5) Backward Citations 291180 12.43 21.29 1 1132 
(6) Other Inventor Ties 311613 0.79 1.86 0 50 
(7) Inventor Experience 311613 3.33 7.47 1 207 
(8) Male 298295 0.91 0.29 0 1 
(9) Firm Herfindahl * 10 311564 0.27 0.46 0 10 
(10) Independent Inventors in Area 311564 127.97 105.42 0 520 
(11) New Firms in Database in this year 311564 8085.34 2861.33 86 1.24E+04 
(12) Previous Affiliation 311613 0.18 0.38 0 1 
(13) Size of any Previous Affiliation 311613 522.67 3270.1 0 5.85E+04 
(14) Venture Capital Deals in State 274658 351.44 594.9 0 2948 
(15) MSA Entry Rate 278960 11.75 2.11 4.6 33.3 
(16) MSA Exit Rate 278960 10.5 1.57 4.9 28.7 
(17) Time Since Invention 311613 11.18 8.08 0 29 
(18) Lawyer 160075 0.84 0.37 0 1 
(19) Home Value Estimate 3048 541000 1,100,000 27,500 26,200,000 
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Table 3: Correlation Table (a) 
No. Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
(1) Number of Inventors 1.000                   
(2) Claims 0.191 1.000         
(3) Five-year Citations -0.005 0.039 1.000        
(4) Originality 0.124 0.133 0.023 1.000       
(5) Backward Citations 0.170 0.167 0.006 0.196 1.000      
(6) Other Inventor Ties 0.501 0.167 -0.043 0.098 0.093 1.000     
(7) Inventor Experience 0.252 0.128 -0.065 0.073 0.110 0.505 1.000    
(8) Male -0.009 0.036 -0.007 -0.009 0.017 0.015 0.041 1.000   
(9) Firm Herfindahl * 10 -0.031 -0.020 -0.006 -0.048 0.000 -0.018 -0.007 -0.011 1.000  
(10) Independent Inventors in Area -0.079 -0.029 0.042 -0.081 -0.019 -0.072 -0.066 -0.031 -0.266 1.000 
(11) New Firms in Database in this year 0.138 0.184 0.029 0.183 0.051 0.162 0.119 -0.036 -0.109 0.217 
(12) Previous Affiliation 0.509 0.218 -0.066 0.144 0.162 0.544 0.423 0.048 -0.030 -0.123 
(13) Size of any Previous Affiliation 0.239 0.060 -0.028 0.060 0.017 0.337 0.308 0.025 0.024 -0.100 
(14) Venture Capital Deals in State 0.034 0.024 0.034 0.010 0.006 0.037 0.046 -0.013 -0.001 -0.002 
(15) MSA Entry Rate 0.045 0.056 -0.083 0.006 0.023 0.100 0.101 0.042 -0.007 -0.040 
(16) MSA Exit Rate 0.000 0.024 -0.044 -0.007 0.000 0.037 0.046 0.017 -0.003 -0.004 
(17) Time Since Invention -0.085 -0.138 0.144 -0.132 -0.063 -0.104 -0.012 0.000 0.038 -0.044 
(18) Lawyer 0.050 0.090 -0.008 0.035 0.036 0.036 0.036 0.038 -0.011 -0.005 
(19) Home Value Estimate -0.006 0.033 0.022 0.034 -0.008 0.034 0.026 -0.032 0.009 -0.016 
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Table 4: Correlation Table (b) 
No. Variable (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16) (17) (18) (19) 
(11) New Firms in Database in this year 1.000                 
(12) Previous Affiliation 0.196 1.000               
(13) Size of any Previous Affiliation 0.074 0.340 1.000             
(14) Venture Capital Deals in State 0.084 0.038 0.005 1.000           
(15) MSA Entry Rate -0.037 0.108 0.032 0.091 1.000         
(16) MSA Exit Rate 0.002 0.032 -0.007 0.162 0.678 1.000       
(17) Time Since Invention -0.324 -0.084 -0.020 0.044 -0.354 -0.212 1.000     
(18) Lawyer -0.008 0.100 0.023 -0.023 0.023 -0.001 0.018 1.000   
(19) Home Value Estimate -0.056 0.009 -0.006 0.223 0.100 0.088 -0.048 0.042 1.000 
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Table 5: Descriptive Statistics by Entrepreneurship Condition 
 
  Garage Entrepreneur = 1 Garage Entrepreneur = 0 
No. Variable Mean Std. Dev Min Max Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
(1) Number of Inventors 1.99 1.4 1 27 1.67 1.39 1 33 
(2) Claims 16.44 13.53 1 195 14.06 12.36 1 683 
(3) Five-year Citations 1.51 3.9 0 82 1.44 4.06 0 395 
(4) Originality 0.38 0.29 0 0.9363 0.37 0.29 0 1 
(5) Backward Citations 13.04 17.18 1 672 12.41 21.39 1 1132 
(6) Other Inventor Ties 0.96 1.24 0 21 0.79 1.87 0 50 
(7) Inventor Experience 2.76 4.6 1 207 3.34 7.53 1 207 
(8) Male 0.95 0.22 0 1 0.91 0.29 0 1 
(9) Firm Herfindahl 0.24 0.42 0 10 0.27 0.46 0 10 
(10) Independent Inventors in Tech Area 127.36 106.48 0 520 127.98 105.41 0 520 
(11) New Firms in Database in this Year 8069.99 2745 822 1.24E+04 8085.06 2864 86 1.24E+04 
(12) Previous Affiliation 0.18 0.39 0 1 0.18 0.38 0 1 
(13) Size of any Previous Affiliation 130.84 1292 0 4.85E+04 533.64 3308 0 5.85E+04 
(14) Venture Capital Deals in State 302.89 539 0 2948 352.84 596 0 2948 
(15) MSA Entry Rate 12.95 2.13 7.6 33.3 11.72 2.1 4.6 33.3 
(16) MSA Exit Rate 10.91 1.54 5.7 25.3 10.48 1.57 4.9 28.7 
(17) Time Since Invention 5.95 4.99 0 28 11.33 8.1 0 29 
(18) Lawyer 0.88 0.32 0 1 0.84 0.37 0 1 
(19) Home Value Estimate 647,000 482,000 112,000 2,300,000 540,000 1,100,000 27,500 26,200,000 
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Table 6: Garage Invention and Entrepreneurship Statistics by State 
State Garage Inventors 
Garage 
Inventors 
per Million 
Residents 
Garage 
Entrepreneurs 
Garage 
Entrepreneurs per 
Million Residents 
Alabama 1,629  2,779.47  40  68.25  
Alaska 473  110.82  3  0.70  
Arizona 4,422  1,744.36  149  58.77  
Arkansas 907  205.32  24  5.43  
California 33,651  1,079.07  1,409  45.18  
Colorado 3,863  1,003.78  189  49.11  
Connecticut 3,115  932.96  127  38.04  
Delaware 416  572.13  9  12.38  
Florida 13,072  909.44  376  26.16  
Georgia 3,753  509.94  143  19.43  
Hawaii 718  616.89  12  10.31  
Idaho 1,147  95.71  33  2.75  
Illinois 8,162  1,394.77  281  48.02  
Indiana 2,991  1,036.21  112  38.80  
Iowa 1,569  1,325.23  47  39.70  
Kansas 1,615  624.66  60  23.21  
Kentucky 1,335  341.83  45  11.52  
Louisiana 2,873  655.09  90  20.52  
Maine 706  114.97  25  4.07  
Maryland 3,761  751.61  128  25.58  
Massachusetts 5,276  4,253.92  237  191.09  
Michigan 7,737  806.37  278  28.97  
Minnesota 4,233  911.80  204  43.94  
Mississippi 7,737  1,439.75  278  51.73  
Missouri 3,097  1,137.59  112  41.14  
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Table 6 (continued) 
Montana 800  921.85  29  33.42  
Nebraska 1,080  940.59  29  25.26  
Nevada 1,541  208.22  53  7.16  
New Hampshire 1,077  133.43  47  5.82  
New Jersey 6,662  3,977.78  262  156.43  
New Mexico 1,088  58.95  44  2.39  
New York 13,427  20,594.70  473  725.50  
North Carolina 3,850  2,318.31  150  90.33  
North Dakota 524  321.72  14  8.60  
Ohio 6,194  556.91  239  21.49  
Oklahoma 2,241  668.97  65  19.40  
Oregon 2,994  951.26  132  41.94  
Pennsylvania 7,354  605.81  216  17.80  
Rhode Island 635  624.28  17  16.71  
South Carolina 1,820  483.16  65  17.26  
South Dakota 451  615.08  16  21.82  
Tennessee 2,506  470.87  73  13.72  
Texas 11,419  596.75  412  21.53  
Utah 2,156  1,069.44  118  58.53  
Vermont 482  72.86  23  3.47  
Virginia 3,903  6,748.09  151  261.07  
Washington 4,599  858.70  174  32.49  
West Virginia 607  118.05  15  2.92  
Wisconsin 3,494  1,893.67  148  80.21  
Wyoming 417  843.26  9  18.20  
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Table 7: Results (a) – Cox Proportional Hazard Models 
Description Model 1 
 Full Model 
Main Independent Variables  
  
Number of Inventors 1.194*** 
 (0.008) 
Prior Unique Ties of Inventors 1.157*** 
 (0.009) 
Firm Herfindahl (0-10) 0.692*** 
 (0.038) 
Total Independent in Tech Area (log) 0.890*** 
 (0.014) 
Venture Capital Deals in State (log) 1.035*** 
 (0.009) 
MSA Entry Rate 1.024** 
 (0.008) 
MSA Exit Rate 0.987 
 (0.012) 
Inventor Experience  (log) 2.068*** 
 (0.056) 
Previous Affiliation 1.936*** 
 (0.112) 
Size of Previous Affiliation (log) 0.763*** 
 (0.010) 
Time Since (years) 0.935*** 
 (0.004) 
Control Variables  
  
Claims (log) 1.367*** 
 (0.023) 
Five-year Citations 0.999 
 (0.003) 
Originality 1.270*** 
 (0.063) 
Backward Citations 1.003*** 
 (0.001) 
Male (=1) 2.185*** 
 (0.137) 
New Firms in Database (log) 2.975*** 
 (0.266) 
Observations 1,975,063 
Number of Subjects 152,092 
Number of Events 5,684 
Log-likelihood -61,077.53 
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+ p < 0.10; * p < 0.05; ** p < 0.01; *** p < 0.001 
Standard errors in parentheses; Hazard Ratio presented 
Cox Proportional Hazard Model regression with hazard rates presented.  Outcome is the incident of generating a 
patent with a new technological firm in the year following the independent variables.  
All other outcomes are considered censored in the model. To calculate coefficients, calculate ln(hazard rate).  For 
example, the inventor experience variable coefficient in Model 1 would be ln(2.156) = 0.768. 
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Table 8: Results (b) – Cox Proportional Hazard Models 
Description Model 2 Model 3 
 Non-affiliated 
inventors 
Inventors who 
become affiliated 
Main Independent Variables   
   
Number of Inventors 1.265*** 0.952* 
 (0.006) (0.021) 
Prior Unique Ties of Inventors 1.202*** 1.042* 
 (0.009) (0.020)
Firm Herfindahl (0-10) 0.589*** 0.835 
 (0.039) (0.117)
Total Independent in Tech Area (log) 0.856*** 1.025 
 (0.015) (0.035)
Venture Capital Deals in State (log) 1.039*** 1.069** 
 (0.010) (0.023)
MSA Entry Rate 1.019* 1.030 
 (0.009) (0.022)
MSA Exit Rate 0.978 0.983 
 (0.013) (0.033)
Inventor Experience  (log) 2.196*** 1.907*** 
 (0.070) (0.100)
Previous Affiliation   
   
Size of Previous Affiliation (log)  0.913*** 
  (0.011)
Time Since (years) 0.924*** 0.982* 
 (0.006) (0.007)
Control Variables   
   
Claims (log) 1.427*** 1.246*** 
 (0.027) (0.053)
Five-year Citations 0.999 0.986+ 
 (0.003) (0.008)
Originality 1.218*** 1.375** 
 (0.066) (0.168)
Backward Citations 1.006*** 1.003** 
 (0.001) (0.001)
Male (=1) 2.451*** 1.332+ 
 (0.172) (0.198)
New Firms in Database (log) 3.086*** 1.910*** 
 (0.348) (0.317)
 
 
1,838,365 136,698 
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Observations 
Number of Subjects 140,913 11,179 
Number of Events 4,717 967 
Log-likelihood -50,044.72 -8,245.02 
+ p < 0.10; * p < 0.05; ** p < 0.01; *** p < 0.001 
Standard errors in parentheses; Hazard Ratio presented 
Cox Proportional Hazard Model regression with hazard rates presented.  Outcome is the incident of generating a 
patent with a new technological firm in the year following the independent variables.  
All other outcomes are considered censored in the model. 
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Table 9: Results (c) – Cox Proportional Hazard Models 
Description Model 4 Model 5 
 1998 onward 2005 Model with 
Home Value 
Main Independent Variables   
   
Number of Inventors 1.145*** 1.154 
 (0.012) (0.342) 
Prior Unique Ties of Inventors 1.103*** 5.406* 
 (0.014) (4.026)
Firm Herfindahl (0-10) 0.795** 1.486 
 (0.066) (0.986)
Total Independent in Tech Area (log) 0.896*** 1.982+ 
 (0.020) (0.773)
Venture Capital Deals in State (log) 1.042** 1.087 
 (0.013) (0.226)
MSA Entry Rate 1.031* 0.998 
 (0.015) (0.194)
MSA Exit Rate 1.012 1.021 
 (0.026) (0.359)
Inventor Experience  (log) 1.876*** 0.000 
 (0.068) (0.000)
Previous Affiliation 1.972*** 0.000 
 (0.154) (0.000)
Size of Previous Affiliation (log) 0.783*** 54.736 
 (0.013) (2.87e10)
Time Since (years) 0.958*** 0.000 
 (0.006) (0.000)
Control Variables   
   
Claims (log) 1.270*** 0.655 
 (0.033) (0.206)
Five-year Citations 0.993 1.304 
 (0.005) (0.233)
Originality 1.366*** 8.618+ 
 (0.105) (10.979)
Backward Citations 1.003*** 0.986 
 (0.001) (0.024)
Male (=1) 1.811*** 2.235 
 (0.149) (2.354)
New Firms in Database (log) 0.985 0.623 
 (0.131) (0.000)
Lawyer 1.579*** 2.4e16 
 (0.111) (0.000)
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Zillow Estimate of Home Value  1.427+ 
  (0.369)
Observations 658,241 9,246 
Number of Subjects 79,061 2,328 
Number of Events 2,485 18 
Log-likelihood -25,630.14 -78.80 
+ p < 0.10; * p < 0.05; ** p < 0.01; *** p < 0.001 
Standard errors in parentheses; Hazard Ratio presented 
Cox Proportional Hazard Model regression with hazard rates presented.  Outcome is the incident of generating a 
patent with a new technological firm in the year following the independent variables.  
All other outcomes are considered censored in the model. 
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Table 10: Interaction Model with Post-Firm Affiliation (Cox Model) 
Description Model 6 
 Full Interaction Model 
Interacted Variables with Post-Firm Affiliation  
  
x.Number of Inventors 0.761*** 
 (0.016) 
x.Prior Unique Ties of Inventors 0.840*** 
 (0.021) 
x.Inventor Experience (log) 0.930 
 (0.067) 
x.Firm Herfindahl (0-10) 1.505** 
 (0.224) 
x.Total Independent in Tech Area (log) 1.234*** 
 (0.042) 
x.Venture Capital Deals in State (log) 1.067** 
 (0.025) 
x.MSA Entry Rate 1.040+ 
 (0.022) 
x.MSA Exit Rate 0.979 
 (0.028) 
Main Independent Variables  
  
Number of Inventors 1.257*** 
 (0.007) 
Prior Unique Ties of Inventors 1.191*** 
 (0.009)
Firm Herfindahl (0-10) 0.622*** 
 (0.039)
Total Independent in Tech Area (log) 0.861*** 
 (0.014)
Venture Capital Deals in State (log) 1.028** 
 (0.010)
MSA Entry Rate 1.018* 
 (0.009)
MSA Exit Rate 0.987 
 (0.013)
Inventor Experience (log) 2.078*** 
 (0.060)
Previous Affiliation 1.259** 
 (0.110)
Size of Previous Affiliation (log) 0.808*** 
 (0.013)
Time Since (years) 0.935*** 
 (0.004)
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Control Variables  
  
Claims (log) 1.371*** 
 (0.024)
Five-year Citations 0.998 
 (0.003)
Originality 1.242*** 
 (0.062)
Backward Citations 1.004*** 
 (0.001)
Male (=1) 2.235*** 
 (0.142)
New Firms in Database (log) 2.982*** 
 (0.267)
Observations 1,975,063 
Number of Subjects 152,092 
Number of Events 5,684 
Log-likelihood -60,825.01 
+ p < 0.10; * p < 0.05; ** p < 0.01; *** p < 0.001 
Standard errors in parentheses; Hazard Ratio presented 
Cox Proportional Hazard Model regression with hazard rates presented.  Outcome is the incident of generating a patent 
with a new technological firm in the year following the independent variables.  
All other outcomes are considered as censored in the model.  All subjects started as garage inventors but the x. variables 
refer to the interaction after some become affiliated to a non-entrepreneurial company. 
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Table 11: Robustness Test – Logit Model 
Description Model 7 
 Logit Model 
Number of Inventors 1.193*** 
 (0.008) 
Prior Unique Ties of Inventors 1.140*** 
 (0.010) 
Firm Herfindahl (0-10) 0.730*** 
 (0.037) 
Total Independent in Tech Area (log) 0.920*** 
 (0.013) 
Venture Capital Deals in State (log) 0.993 
 (0.008) 
MSA Entry Rate 1.022** 
 (0.007) 
MSA Exit Rate 1.052*** 
 (0.010) 
Inventor Experience (log) 2.457*** 
 (0.052) 
Previous Affiliation 2.491*** 
 (0.134) 
Size of Previous Affiliation (log) 0.735*** 
 (0.009) 
Time Since (years) 0.890*** 
 (0.003) 
Claims (log) 1.340*** 
 (0.022) 
Five-year Citations 0.998 
 (0.003) 
Originality 1.169*** 
 (0.055) 
Backward Citations 1.000 
 (0.001) 
Male (=1) 2.271*** 
 (0.134) 
New Firms in Database (log) 1.013 
 (0.039) 
Observations 2,209,321 
Number of Groups 153,184 
Wald χ2 9,058.89 
Prob > χ2 0.00 
* p<0.05; ** p<0.01; *** p<0.001 
xtgee command in stata based on a time-series logistic analysis.  Standard errors in parentheses; odds ratio presented; 
Event is a further patent with a garage entrepreneurial firm. 
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FIGURES 
 
 
 
Figure 1: Basic Model of Garage Entrepreneurship1 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2: USPTO Patents by Independent Inventors: 1980 –2004 
                                                            
1 Adapted from the model with prior knowledge from Shane (2000)  as well as the “User Entrepreneurship 
Model” in Shah and Tripsas (2007: 129) as compared to the “Classic Entrepreneurship Model” starting with 
Opportunity Identification, firm formation, and development of solution. 
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Figure 3: Firm Foundation Delay from Last Patent for Garage Inventors 
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Figure 4: Example of Survival Analysis Data Structure 
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Figure 5: Garage Inventors by State 
 
Figure 6: Garage Inventors Weighted by State Population (per million) 
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Figure 7: Garage Entrepreneurs by State 
 
Figure 8: Garage Entrepreneurs Weighted by State Population (per million) 
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APPENDIX: COMPANY VERIFICATION 
 
Identification 
This section details a process verification of the new firms identified within the patent 
database.  The data identification for this study relies on two definitions:  
1) Initial patenting career of an inventor as an independent inventor without prior 
organizational affiliation.  
2) Starting of a new company identified as a new patenting organization within the 
USPTO database. 
The theoretical model for this dissertation does not necessarily hinge on absolutely no 
prior organizational experience but does want to disconnect the knowledge creation, or the 
“aha moment,” for the first invention from a model of clear knowledge spillover from 
previous technical positions.  The empirical definition was chosen to limit that link to prior 
jobs that may have provided more direct inspiration than my model allows.  Additionally, if 
the inventor has a direct employment contract, the garage technology should be assigned to 
the established organization.  This could be more disconnected if the inventor already is an 
entrepreneur with a company and sees no difference between assigning the garage patent to 
himself/herself or his/her organization, creating an identification error for my analysis.  This 
also has a positive effect for future related study in this area by selecting those individuals 
who are actually entrepreneurs and owners rather than employees of other organizations. 
 This possible identification error is then related to the identification of number 2 also.  
The firm is indeed a new entity within the patenting data but the question is when did the 
company actually get founded?  This can affect the time series analysis as to when to apply 
environmental conditions to the decision to become an entrepreneur.  This also affects the 
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theoretical model separating the invention decision from the entrepreneurship decision.  I 
performed a manual search process in order to validate the firm identification.  I randomized 
the list of new firms from the data but manually searched for information about them with a 
goal of 2–3 per year from the sample.  This resulted in searching for 72 firms that I had 
identified as new patenting organizations during 1980 – 2009.  The summary by year is 
presented in Table 12.   
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Table 12: Firm Founding Verification Table by Year 
Year No. Checked Newly Founded Pre-Founded No Info 
1980 2 1 1 0 
1981 1 0 1 0 
1982 2 1 0 1 
1983 2 2 0 0 
1984 2 2 0 0 
1985 2 1 0 1 
1986 2 1 0 1 
1987 3 1 1 1 
1988 2 1 1 0 
1989 2 1 1 0 
1990 2 2 0 0 
1991 3 1 1 1 
1992 2 2 0 0 
1993 3 1 1 1 
1994 2 1 1 0 
1995 3 1 0 2 
1996 3 2 0 1 
1997 3 1 1 1 
1998 2 2 0 0 
1999 2 1 0 1 
2000 3 2 0 1 
2001 2 2 0 0 
2002 3 2 0 1 
2003 2 2 0 0 
2004 4 2 1 1 
2005 4 2 1 1 
2006 2 2 0 0 
2007 2 2 0 0 
2008 3 2 0 1 
2009 2 2 0 0 
*The early years (1980-1982) represent all the “new firms” in the USPTO database given the garage inventor 
to garage entrepreneur definition. 
 
The full summary of the validation is presented in Table 13.  I searched for 72 firms and was 
able to verify information for 56 of them, or about 78%.  Of the 56 that I could verify, 80% 
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of them were founded after the date of the inventor’s garage invention.  I found that the other 
20% of the firms were incorporated prior to the garage invention.     
Table 13: Summary of Firm Founding Verification 
Status  Count of Firms % of Known % of All Searched 
Total Checked 72     
Total Found 56   
    
Total Newly Founded 45 80% 63% 
Total Pre-Founded 11 20% 15% 
Total No Info 16   22% 
I now detail examples of the verification process. 
Example Search Process and Vignettes 
To verify the information on firm foundings, I researched each firm and the known inventor 
through Google to collect information.  This started with a survival and success bias for the 
firms that still had websites or had founder stories available.  The next few firms all represent 
different categories of garage inventors and entrepreneurs that were originally in the data and 
information could be found.   
Paice, LLC 
Alex Severinsky founded Paice, LLC to commercialize patents he developed 
concerning hybrid vehicle technology.  Severinsky held a PhD in Electrical Engineering and 
was working as an instructor at the University of Maryland’s engineering school.  He 
developed patent 5,343,970 for a “Hybrid electric vehicle” and filed for a patent on 
September 21, 1992, which was granted on September 6, 1994 (Severinsky, 1994).  This 
patent was assigned to him alone.  Recognizing the potential value, he applied for and was 
admitted into the University of Maryland’s business incubator program.  According to the 
Paice website history, Dr. Severinsky’s interest in finding a solution to car efficiency 
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problems was aroused while waiting in line for gas in the late 1970’s (Alex Severinsky | 
Hybrid Technologist | Paice Hybrid LLC, 2013).  Following this, he founded Paice, LLC and 
subsequently developed more patents related to hybrid vehicles including: 
- Patent 6,209,672 refining the “hybrid vehicle” design on September 9, 1999 and 
is assigned to Paice. (Severinsky, 2001) 
- Patent for “Engine start and shutdown control in hybrid vehicles” on September 
10, 1999 that is co-invented and assigned to Paice (Severinsky and Louckes, 
2011). 
These patents are significant in defining the functional operating range for hybrid 
vehicle connections.  The American Society of Mechanical Engineers has recognized Dr. 
Severinsky’s technical accomplishments as significant by awarding him the Thomas A. 
Edison Patent Award for technologies of importance for breakthroughs or that lead to 
valuable companies.   
A patent attorney firm performed an analysis of the hybrid industry and concluded 
that Paice held four of the top nine most dominant patents by citations (Lloyd and Blows, 
2009).  Paice has won lawsuits for patent infringement against Ford and Toyota resulting in a 
forced licensing fee for their hybrid car sales.  Paice has open lawsuits against Kia and 
Hyundai. (Paice, LLC, 2010). 
However, this was not his first venture.  Dr. Severinsky had previously founded Viteq 
which developed uninterrupted power supplies for computers.  He developed 14 patents 
between 1987 (Severinsky, 1989) and 1991 (Severinsky, 1989) for Viteq before he sold the 
business. While this company fits the pattern of independent invention turned new firm, due 
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to his prior patenting relationship, Dr. Severinsky and Paice is removed from the strict 
identification analysis for this study but offers more opportunity for future study. 
 Lastly, Dr. Severinsky stepped down as the CEO of Paice in 2006 and founded a new 
company, Fuelcor.    
Denecke, Inc. 
Denecke, Inc. makes electronic time code slates for the movie and entertainment businesses.  
A time code slate is the “clapper” used by directors at the beginning of shots.  The founder, 
Mike Denecke, was working on film sets at the time as a sound and electronic designer.  The 
owner of another firm, Ivan Kruglak from Coherent Communications, introduced Mike to 
one of the first electronic time slates in 1985.  Mike recognized the value of syncing multiple 
shots electronically but the product was not taking off (Denecke, 1997b).  Under his legal 
name, Henry M. Denecke applied for a patent for a “Time Code Decoder” on May 24, 1985, 
which would result in patent 4,646,167 granted on February 24, 1987 (Denecke, 1987).  
Mike Denecke is the owner of this patent.  Before this, Mike Denecke was also the inventor 
of two patents:  
- Patent 4,227,126 applied for on February 21, 1978 for a “Shaft rotation interlock 
system for film editing tables and the like” (Denecke, 1980).  
- Patent 4,328,484 applied for on September 2, 1980 for a “Method and apparatus for 
numerically converting a parallel binary coded number from a first unit system to a 
second unit system (Denecke, 1982). 
Following these non-assigned patents, Mike filed for a patent for a “Battery Holder”, 
numbered 5,601,940 on May 11, 1995 under the company name “Denecke, Inc.” (Denecke, 
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1997a).  The Denecke time code slates are the “industry standard” according to their website 
(Denecke, 1997b). 
Denecke, Inc. was actually founded in 1975 by Mike Denecke as a personal venture.  
He diversified into the technology market as he saw a demand and could develop the product 
(Denecke, 1997b).  Due to this reason, he qualifies under the initial patent-level identification 
strategy but would be removed upon full company verification. 
Braintexter Inc. 
Founded by Riccardo and Flavio Vieri, Braintexter Inc. holds patents regarding short 
message service (SMS) texting.  Specifically, they independently developed a patent to 
convert SMS text to speech (Vieri, Tomasso, and Vieri, 2007) in 2003.  Subsequently, they 
developed a method for applying contextual advertising based on the sender, receiver, and 
content of text messages in 2009 (Vieri, 2009) and 2013 (Vieri, 2013). The text-to-speech 
patent was independently owned but the advertising patents were subsequently assigned to 
their new firm, Braintexter Inc (Braintexter Inc: About Us, 2010).  In 2008, Braintexter, Inc., 
was incorporated in Delaware (Bizapedia, 2014) and Riccardo and Flavio Vieri reassigned 
their older patents to the firm.  In 2011, Braintexter’s patents were sold and reassigned to 
Apple (Vieri et al., 2007).   
Dietrick Sports Products 
Donald E. Cech developed patent 5,630,652 for a “releasable axle assembly for skate 
wheels” (Cech, 1997) in 1995 and created the company Dietrick Sports Products, Inc.  Prior 
to this, Donald Cech has developed two previous patents related to skating – Patent 
5,226,673 for a “Braking Assembly and Method” in 1991 (Cech, 1993) and Patent 5,351,974 
for “In-line skate braking assembly and method” in 1992 (Cech, 1994). 
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Figure 9: Donald Cech’s Invention of "Releasable Axle Assembly for Skate Wheels" 
Living in Colorado, he assigned this patent to a new firm, Dietrick Sports Products, Inc. in 
Steamboat Springs, Colorado (Cech, 1997). 
Stamps.com, Inc. 
Mohan Ananda is the founding CEO of Stamps.com, which is highlighted by his 
public LinkedIn profile in Figure 10.  He has three independent patents and starts his 
patenting career as a garage inventor within the newly developed “Business Method Patents” 
class 705 in the USPTO classification system.  All of his original three patents start with the 
title “Secure software rental system using… (Ananda, 1996a, 1996b, 1997).”  His fourth 
patent, 6,671,813 (Ananda, 2003), is filed under Stamps.com, which does cite one of his 
earlier patents.  It is the first patent by that organization.  This patent is for “Secure on-line 
PC postage metering system.”  He then has four more patents under the organization 
Stamps.com.  By the time he has his fifth organizational patent, it is actually the 27th patent 
for Stamps.com overall.  He ends with two more independent patents to end his patenting 
career within this data, for a total of 10 patents. 
 76 
 
 
Figure 10: Mohan Ananda LinkedIn Profile - Stamps.com 
Metcast Associates 
The next series of organizations have better founding information.  Figure 11 is a cut-out of 
the patent page for Daniel Groteke’s first patent.  Mr. Groteke lives on 1228 Ridge Cliff Rd., 
Cincinnati, Ohio and files for what will become patent 4,394,271 on April 23, 1981 for an 
“Apparatus and Method for Filtration of Molten Metal” (Groteke, 1983).  
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Figure 11: Daniel Groteke Garage Patent 
On April 20, 1984, he and Avery Kearney, living in Cincinnati, Ohio and Valparaiso, Indiana 
respectively, jointly file for a patent for “Molten Metal Transfer Crucible with External 
Filter” (Groteke and Kearney, 1986).  In Figure 12, I can see that this patent is assigned to 
Metcast Associates, based in Cincinnati, Ohio.   
 
Figure 12: Daniel Groteke Entrepreneur Patent 
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Next, website Bizapedia.com provides a resource for searching business names and 
individuals involved in incorporating businesses across the United States.  Figure 13 
demonstrates one such result.  From this search, it is clear that Metcast Associates was 
founded on June 24, 1976, registered in Ohio, and owned by one principal – Daniel E. 
Groteke (Bizapedia, 2016).  The information is in line with the patenting behavior but 
demonstrates that the entity was founded prior to the garage invention patent that had been 
personally assigned by the inventor.   
 
Figure 13: Example Search Result Showing Metcast Associates Founding Date 
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3Sixty Technologies, LLC 
Another test with Bizapedia verification comes from Albert E. Johnstone.  He and Frank 
Ratliff develops a patent 7,107,725 in 2001 for “Swivel joint apparatus and method for utility 
supply to a rotatable building,” originally assigned to Albert and Janet Johnstone.  By the 
time the patent is granted in September 2006, Johnstone assigns it to the new company, 
3sixty Technologies (Johnstone III and Ratliff, 2006).  On May 31, 2006, he, Frank Ratliff, 
David A. Berg, and Michael L. Rogers file for the first patent to be originally assigned to this 
new company also (Ratliff et al., 2009).  From the Bizapedia results in Figure 14, I can see 
that 3Sixty Technologies, LLC was founded on May 25, 2006 by Al Johnstone, living in La 
Mesa, California, and David A. Berg living in Henderson, NV (Bizapedia, 2015).  Albert 
Johnstone was the hobbyist and visionary for rotating buildings, designing the technology 
and the building himself.  David Berg saw a news article about the Johnstone family house, 
the first test of the technology, and partnered with Johnstone and his colleagues between 
2004 and 2006 to form the new 3Sixty Technologies as its CEO. 
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Figure 14: Example Founding Information for 3sixty Technologies, LLC 
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Innovative Sports, Inc. 
 
Figure 15: Brent Jones Garage Patent 5,678,344 
 
Innovative Sports, Inc. is a company that appears in the patent database for the first time on a 
patent filed for in 1998.  Brent Jones had an original patent, viewed in Figure 15, for 
“Firearm Casing Device” with colleagues in 1996, granted in 1997, which is assigned to 
three co-inventors (Jones, Parker, and Durham, 1997).   
 
Figure 16: Innovative Sports Garage Entrepreneurial Patent 6,119,388 
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In 1998, they follow up with patent 6,119,388 (Jones, Parker, and Durham, 2000), further 
improving the line of firearm casing device, and assigned to their new company, Innovative 
Sports, Inc.  This patent was filed on May 21, 1998 and granted on September 19, 2000.  
Through detailed search, a news article from the Spartanburg Herald Journal, presented in 
Figure 17, highlights their founding in 1997 and early business details (Orr, 1999), which is 
after the trio’s first patent and before their second application.   
 
 
Figure 17: News Search Results Detailing Innovative Sports’ Founding year 
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Example Technologies Never Associated with New Firms 
For reference, Table 14 provides a random list of technologies and inventors who were never 
associated with a firm beyond the development of the focal independent technology.  This 
allows insight into the control group that was at risk of firm formation but never proceeded 
beyond the independent technological development. 
Table 14: Example Technologies and Inventors Never Associated with a New Firm 
# Patent First Name Last Name Application Date Technology 
1 4317653 MARTHA S WAHL 1/21/1980 Educational blocks 
2 4340364 MILTON G DEEMER 8/18/1980 Endodontic test file 
3 4468721 STEVEN VANDRILLA 5/11/1983 Candle assemblies employing a window sill locking leash 
4 4513573 HARALD F FUNK 9/9/1983 
System for treating and 
recovering energy from exhaust 
gases 
5 4541547 RONALD J MIKNYOCKI 10/21/1983 Token or card dispenser 
6 4520431 MICHAEL FANELLI 6/11/1984 Collapsible Lantern 
7 4592483 RAYMOND E SCOUTEN 8/6/1984 Container and separate co-operating lid 
8 4668250 JAN T DRESE 6/14/1985 
Process for continuously 
removing and recovering 
respectively a gas dissolved in a 
liquid, particularly ammonia 
from aqueous ammonia waste 
water 
9 4644683 DARRELL R JONES 7/12/1985 
Method and apparatus for 
enhancing the pollination of 
alfalfa 
10 4884033 NOEL P MCCONCHIE SR 6/6/1988 
Diagnostic test apparatus for 
electrical system of automotive 
vehicle 
11 4846443 HARVEY C COLLINS 7/13/1988 Floor covering installation tool 
12 5021424 JENNYLYN LAWTON WALL 6/1/1989 
Vitamin composition for 
treatment of flea infestation in 
animals 
13 4966320 MITCHELL BLOOM 11/13/1989 Simulated pouch with interior, concealed holster 
14 5125526 ARNOLD J SUMANIS 11/21/1991 
Waste receptacle with interior 
bag that is opened and closed 
automatically 
15 5743105 KEIJIRO YAMAUCHI 9/30/1994 Apparatus for producing ice vessel 
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